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TOWARD A CRITICAL CORPORATE LAW
PEDAGOGY AND SCHOLARSHIP
andr6 douglas pond cummings*
STEVEN A. RAMIREZ"
CHERYL L. WADE**
I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the publicly held corporation has assumed a central
position in both the economic and political spheres of American life.'
Economically, the public coToration has long acted as the key institution
within American capitalism. Politically, the public corporation now can
use its economic might to sway electoral outcomes as never before.
Indeed, individuals who control public firms wield more economic power
and political power today than ever before.4 These truths profoundly shape
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1.

Tom C.W. Lin, The CorporateGovernance of 1conic Executives, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

351, 372 (2011) ("Because corporations play such a vital role in the life of individuals and states, their
governance can impact a whole host of prosaic and profound issues.").
2.

STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM 49 (2013) (terming the public corporation the

"perfect capital aggregator under law" due to limited liability, perpetual investment horizon,
centralized management, locked-in capital, and shareholder primacy).
3. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 319, 339-40 (2010)
(holding that the government cannot prohibit independent corporate expenditures and invalidating part
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that restricted electioneering communications).
4. CEO compensation, for example, continues its inexorable upward trajectory. Gary Strauss et
al., The 0.1 Percent; Millions by Millions, CEO Pay Goes Up, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2014, at IB
("2013 median [CEO] pay . .. jumped 13% to $10.5 million . . . .").
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American society.5 The power, control, and role of the public corporation
under law and regulation, therefore, hold more importance than ever
before.
Even though corporate law and regulation define all aspects of this
central economic and political institution within the American system, the
development of corporate law is impeded by a deficient pedagogy-and
thus, to a certain degree, scholarship-that scarcely mentions the power
and influence corporations hold. Critical voices, in particular, are excluded
from virtually all corporate law textbooks. Many corporate law texts
taught in law school classrooms treat the social role of the public
corporation as a black box of corporate law pedagogy and, by extension,
mainstream legal scholarship.7 Indeed, a relentless stream of legal
scholarship challenging the law and regulation of the public firm from the
perspective of its broader social and economic implications receives little
to no mention in the key textbooks adopted and taught from in law schools
today.t This Article challenges the dominant corporate law master

5. Indeed, corporate and financial elites now constitute about half of the top .01 percent (or one
in 10,000) of the income distribution, and virtually all of the growth over the most recent decades
accrued to this group. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 1-13, 22-28,
46, 48 (2010). Corporate law fuels economic inequality. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-

FIRST CENTURY 302 (2014) ("Recent research, based on matching declared income on tax returns with
corporate compensation records, allows me to state that the vast majority (60 to 70 percent, depending
on what definitions one chooses) of the top 0.1 percent of the income hierarchy in 2000-2010 consists
of top managers.").
6. Modem economic and financial scholarship agrees. For instance, in recent years, experts in
finance and financial economics have increasingly studied the importance of corporate law and
corporate governance on firm performance and macroeconomic performance. Compare Harold
Demsetz, The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 426 (1997)
(stating that under "neoclassical theory" the firm is a "black box" in that its functioning is assumed to
be optimal), with M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of Corporate Governance
from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, BoardDiversity, EarningsManagement, and Managerial

Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REV. 1, 12-13 (2003) (giving an overview of empirical evidence
regarding the impact of diversity and other elements of corporate governance variation on financial
performance).
7. This Article reviewed five major corporate law texts: MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D.
Cox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (11th ed. unabr. 2014); CHARLES R.T.
O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES
AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2014); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
(8th ed. 2013); WILLIAM KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 2012); DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS

STRUCTURES (3d ed. 2010).
8. Such critical scholarship, for example, includes: Paul S. Miller, ShareholderRights: Citizens
United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law, 28 J.L. & POL. 53, 91 (2012) (arguing that
shareholders must submit to coerced speech directed by managers under current Delaware law and
Citizens United); john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Beyond Public/Private: Understanding
Excessive Corporate Prerogative, 100 KY. L.J. 43, 66-74 (2011-2012) (arguing against excessive

privatizations and corporate prerogatives); andr6 douglas pond cummings, Procuring "Justice"?:
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narrative perpetuated in all of the major business law textbooks. This
master narrative prevents law students and legal scholars from fully
understanding and analyzing the changing nature and evolution of law and
power in the United States.
In challenging the status quo narrative, law students and scholars today
must consider the fact that at the apex of the modem public firm stands the
Chief Executive Officer ("CEO").9 CEOs act as the new potentates in
American society and manage their firms as "personal fiefdoms." 10 The
pay of CEOs and senior executives at the largest firms proves their power,
as they now command enormous salaries beyond most athletes or movie
stars and far beyond any ordinary citizen or employee." Never before has
the American economy produced so much for the benefit of so few-most
of whom are corporate or financial elites.1 2 Recently, data on current
inequality affirms that wealth gaps have again reached the historically high

Citizens United, Caperton, and Partisan Judicial Elections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89, 97-99 (2010)
(showing pernicious impact of Citizens United on judicial independence); Thuy-Nga T. Vo, To Be or
Not to Be Both CEO and Board Chair, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 126-29 (2010) (concluding that
combining of chairman and CEO roles contributes to excessive CEO power and diminished financial
performance); Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C.
L. REV. 367, 414-27 (2008) (noting that class action lawsuits are necessary to assure corporate
diversity); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director

Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (2008) ("[T]he status quo is
not director primacy, shareholder primacy, or team production, but CEO primacy-governance by
managers largely for their own benefit."); Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest
Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags In America's Boardrooms and What To Do About It, 61

WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1583, 1613 (2004) (concluding that CEOs work to place cronies on the board of
their firms and forgo diversity).
9. Legendary mutual fund founder John Bogle claims that a "pathological mutation" has
gripped the public corporation, transmogrifying traditional "owners' capitalism" into "managers'
capitalism." JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005).

10. According to economist and Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz, American CEOs manage
corporations as a "personal fiefdom, not for the shareholders, but for their own benefit." In particular,
immediately preceding the financial crisis of 2007-2009 firms "reported high profits, gave big
bonuses, big stock options, but in fact there were huge risks buried off-balance sheet and those
chickens have now come home to roost." Talk of the Nation: Economists Explain

'How to Save

Capitalism', NPR (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=95906243.
11. For example, a joint study of CEO compensation at the largest firms conducted by Equilar
Inc. "found that the median 2012 pay package came in at $15.1 million-a leap of 16 percent from
2011." Gretchen Morgenson, An Unstoppable Climb in C.E.O. Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2013, at
BUl.
12. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 5, at 1-4 (showing how high inequality, arising largely from
high payouts to corporate and financial elites, operated to create a rigged economic system); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE

119-22 (2012) (economic account of the causes and consequences of high inequality with a focus on
economic power as a tool to corrupt the political system).
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levels last seen in the chaotic days just prior to the financial collapse of
2008."
Even when chief executives who constitute this new economic royalty
fail badly in their supposed primary task of shareholder wealth
maximization, as they did during the financial market crisis of 2008, they
are still richly paid through stock options or golden parachutes. 14 These
arrangements exist with the consent of their handpicked confederates on
the Board of Directors who too often serve as nominal supervisors." Yet,
issues of CEO power, CEO compensation, golden parachutes, and the
crony capitalism that gives rise to board members with close affinity to the
CEO, ostensibly supervising the CEO, get little discussion in the most
widely used corporations textbooks today.' 6 The manifest costs of CEO
primacy in the public firm are not mentioned at all." Today's law students
will become tomorrow's business leaders, advisors, and policymakers, but

Fairness in Problems of Resource Allocation: Allocators Versus Recipients, 72 J. PERSONALITY

&

13. Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States
(Updated with 2012 Preliminary Estimates) 9 Figure 3 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(archived at http://perma.cc/Z4EE-5XNH).
14. Recently, the former CEO of Target garnered about $55 million in severance pay after being
ousted for a major breach in data security at that firm. Gary Strauss, Ousted Target CEO Could Collect
$55M-Plus, USA TODAY, May 6, 2014, archived at http://perma.cc/448C-8N9F.
15. One infamous example:
Stanley O'Neal, former CEO of Merrill Lynch . .. spent much of his career at Merrill Lynch
and became CEO in 2002, presiding over the company as it began to place huge bets on
subprime mortgages and risky derivatives that generated billions in losses, nearly sank the
firm, and led to a takeover by Bank of America in 2008. In 2006-the year Merrill made
many of the deals that led to its downfall-O'Neal earned $91 million, according to the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. When O'Neal resigned in 2007, Merrill gave him a
severance package worth another $161 million.
Rick Newman, How 11 Corporate Titans ProfitedAfter Failure,U.S. NEWS (June 29, 2011), archived
at http://perma.cc/9N5Q-VE4R.
16. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 907-10 (discussing directors, the Dodd-Frank say on pay
provision, and executive compensation in general but omitting critical analysis of the way
compensation decisions are made); O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1171-73 (discussing
directors, golden parachutes, and executive compensation in general but omitting critical analysis of
the way compensation decisions are made). For a discussion of the potential biases arising from CEOs'
relationship with the board of directors, see Antony Page, Unconscious Bias andthe Limits ofDirector
Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 237, 248 (quoting Kristina A. Diekmann et al., Self-Interest and
Soc. PSYCHOL. 1061, 1061 (1997)) ("As self-interested actors in a world of limited goods and
opportunities, we are motivated to promote and justify resource distributions that favor us and those to
whom we are linked by ties of kinship or group membership.").
17. Joseph Stiglitz, on the other hand, traces the CEO's power to set his or her own
compensation to accelerating inequality, and then to a corrupted legal system and other
macroeconomic ills associated with too much CEO power. STIGLITZ, supra note 12, at 31-39, 40-41,
66-67, 271. See also PIKETrY, supra note 5, at 334 ("The most convincing proof of the failure of
corporate governance and. .extremely high executive pay is that when we collect data about
individual firms ... it is very difficult to explain the observed variations in terms of firm
performance.").
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their legal education regarding corporations suffers from crucial blind
spots. This black hole of knowledge will lead to an intolerable ignorance
on the part of those who propose to lead on global economic issues in the
future.
The ability of the CEO to stack the board of directors with cultural
clones is key to the new power of the CEO. Essentially, in most public
corporations, management selects management under the federal proxy
rules.' 8 The board of the public firm is a product of "homosocial
reproduction" whereby socially important cultural traits such as gender
and race play a decisive role in board membership." This dynamic
contributes to the fact that the governing heights of the American economy
continue to be the last bastion of white male supremacy. 20 Again, despite
important emerging critical scholarship on this fact, 2 1 no major Business

&

18. Under state law, shareholders putatively select directors. In public corporations, however,
"[b]efore directors' elections, companies distribute proxy materials that allow shareholders who do not
attend annual meetings to vote their shares. Typically, these proxy materials include only those
director candidates nominated by the existing board ..... Recent Case, Administrative LawCorporate Governance Regulation-D.C. Circuit Finds SEC Proxy Access Rule Arbitrary and
Capriciousfor Inadequate Economic Analysis-Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C.
2011), 125 HARv. L. REV. 1088, 1088 (2012).
19. Lin, supra note 1, at 363 ("With regards to directors, executives often engage in 'homosocial
reproduction' and select like-minded individuals to work with them and to execute their visions. Thus,
it should not be surprising that many current and former corporate executive officers serve on
corporate boards, even interlocking firms in their service.").
20. James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power,
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. Sc. Q. 60, 77, 79 (1995) (finding
that "in firms in which CEOs are relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically
similar to the firm's incumbent CEO" and that cultural similarity leads to higher compensation). While
some may argue that the problem of white male domination of America's boardrooms arises from
recruitment difficulties or lack of sufficient candidates for board membership, others suggest more
traditional causes of exclusion of diverse voices. According to one leader in the African American
business community because "there is a surplus of black executive talent with sterling professional
credentials and reputations for unmatched performance at the highest levels" the fact that "an
overwhelming number of boards of publicly traded companies still lock African Americans out of the
boardroom" constitutes "a detestable statement that they seek to maintain these preserves of white
male privilege and dominance." Black EnterprisePublishes Exclusive Registry of African Americans
on Corporate Boards, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.blackenterprise.com/career/
black-enterprise-publishes-exclusive-registry-of-african-americans-on-corporate-boards/
(quoting Black
Enterprise CEO Earl "Butch" Graves Jr.). We posit that the white male domination of the boardroom,
whether conscious or unconscious, is simply a numerical fact. Thus, according to the latest survey
conducted by Black Enterprise, 74 of the nation's 250 largest public companies still have zero
African-American directors as of May of 2014. Id.
21. E.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and
PoliticalLegitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 110-il, 127-29
(2014) (arguing that allowing shareholder access to management's proxy solicitation can enhance
engagement and ultimately corporate legitimacy); Bo Becker et al., Does ShareholderProxy Access
Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable's Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127, 157
(2013) (finding that shareholder proxy access is valued in equity markets); Grant M. Hayden
Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L.
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Associations textbook mentions the social realities behind the legal
mechanisms that belie any notion of a meritocracy at the commanding
heights of the economy. Textbooks treat this costly crony capitalism as if
it does not exist, or as if there is no problem with the status quo. 22 This
failure is a critical one.
Corporate governance failings manifest themselves in massive social
costs and reckless risks. Consider the enormous costs of the Enron series
of scandals in 2001-2002,23 the subprime debacle,2 4 or the BP oil spill in
the Gulf of Mexico.25 Each of these instances demonstrates that the costs
of misgoverned public corporations with poor risk management policies
and procedures can reach the trillions.2 6 The key to effective corporate
governance is to maximize the benefits of the corporate form while
minimizing costs. 27 This, in turn, requires a candid discussion of the role

101, 120-22 (2012) (arguing that the decision to deny shareholders access to proxy materials for
purpose of director elections rested upon weak law and economics).
22. See KLEIN ET AL., supranote 7, at xi-xxi; O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at ix-xxiv.

23. See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1887, 1914,
1937-38 (2013) (describing broad externalities associated with securities fraud beyond market
capitalization losses-including an increase in the cost of capital for even honest firms-and
illustrating such costs through the experience of Enron's and WorldCom's bankruptcy in 2001-2002);
Erica Beecher-Monas, Manying Diversity and Independence in the Boardroom: Just How FarHave

You Come, Baby?, 86 OR. L. REv. 373, 377 (2007) (noting that Enron's 14 member board included 12
white males).
24. See generally Christopher J. Miller, Note, Don't Blame Me, Blame the FinancialCrisis: A
Survey of DismissalRulings in J0b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 273
(2011) (discussing cases involving securities fraud in the context of mortgage-related securities created
during the financial crisis and noting $2.2 trillion in bank losses alone from the financial crisis).
25. See Joseph Karl Grant, What Can We Learnfrom the 2010 BP Oil Spill?: Five Important
CorporateLaw and Life Lessons, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 809, 814 (2011) (recounting the loss of over
50 percent of BP's market capitalization in the wake of the Gulf oil spill). BP's losses amount to $42
billion. Selina Williams, BP Views Higher Oil-Spill Costs as Profit Declines, MARKETWATCH (July
30, 2013), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/bp-views-higher-oil-spill-costs-as-profit-declines-201307-30. The damage to the Gulf ecosystem as a result of the BP oil spill is literally incalculable. Gaia J.
Larsen, Skewed Incentives: How Offshore DrillingPolicies Failto Induce Innovation to Reduce Social

and Environmental Costs, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 140 (2012). An acoustic switch to trigger a well
shutdown could have prevented the Deepwater Horizon blowout and costs around $500,000. Id. at
171-72.
26. The governance of corporations formed a core cause of the financial crisis. See FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xviii (2011) (finding that "dramatic

failures of corporate governance and risk management" drove the crisis) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT];
GRANT KIRKPATRICK, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2

(OECD 2009) (finding that "to an important extent" the financial crises arose from "failures and
weaknesses in corporate governance," particularly in the areas of compensation incentives and risk
management). Losses from the crisis include lost wealth of $9 trillion, and forgone GDP could
approach $10 trillion. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS
LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 15, 21 (2013).
27. See Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory

Structuresfor a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 316 n.23 (2007) ("[O]ptimal corporate
governance would minimize net agency costs.").

2014]

CRITICAL CORPORATE LAW PEDAGOGY

403

of the corporation in our economy and political system with appropriate
critiques of manifest shortcomings. 2 8 This Article seeks a more critical
discourse regarding the public corporation and its social and political
impact.
Poorly governed corporations recently posed even greater problems
than the massive economic costs exacted by the crises of recent years. The
corporation now holds a central position in our political system-beyond
the contemplation of any of the nation's Founders29-and that position has
enabled the corporation to seize new profit opportunities in important
social realms. For example, corporations recently emerged as a prime
political player and profiteer in America's mass incarceration campaign.3 o
Today, even education has been corporatized at some schools.31 Should
profit maximizing corporations hold such key social roles such as prison
sentry or school administrator? Are there any limits on the privatization of
government functions through the corporation? Should the corporation be
tethered to its original policy contemplation of fostering business
formation and directly funding innovation? Critical corporate scholars

28. Traditionally, corporations were viewed with healthy skepticism and confined only to
activities that they were specifically chartered to pursue-there were no general business corporations,
much less corporations pursuing business traditionally left to the state or exercising constitutional
rights. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 428 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Even 'the notion that business corporations could invoke
the First Amendment would probably have been quite a novelty,' given that 'at the time, the
legitimacy of every corporate activity was thought to rest entirely in a concession of the
sovereign. "'(citations omitted)). In other words, corporations possessed limited powers defined by the
state, not constitutional rights the state could not infringe.
29.

Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a "Real" ConstitutionalPerson, 11 U.C. DAVIS

Bus. L.J. 221, 265 (2011) ("[W]hile the drafters and ratifiers of the federal organic documents perhaps
used words that if defined broadly could encompass corporations, the drafters and ratifiers did not, at
least during the debates, use those words in a manner consistent with protecting juridical beings as real
constitutional entities.").
30. PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION ix-x (Tara Herivel

& Paul Wright eds., 2007) (providing overview of private interests that earn profits from incarceration
including prison managers, prison builders, prison suppliers, firms that tap into low-cost prison labor,
transportation firms, weapons makers, and bankers and lawyers who structure prison-related deals and
bond offerings).
31.

See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xi-xxi (ignoring privatization); O'KELLEY & THOMPSON,

supra note 7, at ix-xxiv (same). According to recent reports:
Critics see the newest rush to private vendors as more worrisome because school districts are
outsourcing not just supplies but the very core of education: the daily interaction between
student and teacher, the presentation of new material, the quick checks to see which kids have
risen to the challenge and which are hopelessly confused. At the more than 5,500 charter
schools nationwide, private management companies-some of them for-profit-are in full
control of running public schools with public dollars.
Stephanie Simon, Private Firms Eyeing Profits from U.S. Public Schools, REUTERS INDIA (Aug. 2,
2012), archivedat http://perma.cc/J3TL-989D.
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wrestle with these very questions regarding the proper role of the
corporation in our society while corporate textbooks completely ignore
such quandaries.
This Article challenges the benign view of all aspects of corporate law
now prevalent in most major texts in this area and, by implication, much
of the corporate law teaching that goes on in U.S. law schools today. "Law
schools train many of the nation's leaders." 3 3 Textbooks play a central role
in the education of law review editors for their role as gatekeepers to legal
scholarship.34 And, for the business law professoriate, the content of
corporate law textbooks effectively tethers most to very narrow
constructions of American business law, leaving very little space for
critical assessments in the classroom.3 5 Excessive deference to corporate
domination and the power of the CEO marginalizes critical scholarship
that raises uncomfortable questions for those claiming leadership over our
economy.3 6 Critical analysis of corporate law and governance in Business
Associations casebooks will help students and future business leaders to
question the role of the public corporation and understand its advantages
and limitations.
More than ever, CEOs and the public corporations they control exert a
decisive influence over the American economy and political system-and
by extension society itself.3 7 The policy basis for this massive "mission

&

32. Until relatively recently, corporate law textbooks spent significant effort on the role of the
corporations in society and early efforts to contain the corporation to limited spheres. See, e.g.,
NORMAN D. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 54, 63-66 (2d ed. 1971); HARRY G. HENN
JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 4-12 (3d ed. 1983).
33. Susan Sturm, Commentary, Law Schools, Leadership, and Change, 127 HARv. L. REV. F. 49,
49 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/RT24-QV4S.
34. According to Richard Posner, the student-edited law review is "not well-equipped to select,
and through editing to improve, articles outside of the core of legal doctrinal analysis." Richard A.
Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REV. 761, 779
(1987).
35. Cf Juan F. Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery
Constitution, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1149 (2012) (concluding that the failure to include critical
perspectives in constitutional law textbooks "will deter" teaching such perspectives and training future
lawyers to critically question evidence).
36. Id. at 1148-52 (noting that accurate and balanced pedagogy as manifest in casebooks is key
to understanding current inequities, including the subtle racism that continues to pervade U.S. society,
and failure to teach evidence in a balanced fashion "perpetuates widespread ignorance" as well as
"unquestioning reverence" to the Founders).
37.

See, e.g., Janis Sarra, Class Act: ConsideringRace and Gender in the CorporateBoardroom,

79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1121, 1121-25 (2005) (arguing that lack of diversity of corporate boards
exacerbates race and gender discrimination issues); Jayne W. Barnard, CorporateBoards and the New
Environmentalism, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 291 (2007) (assessing corporate
leaders' decision making and its impact on the environment); Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of
Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 457 (2002) (exploring impact of corporate
governance on women); Kent Greenfield & D. Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World with
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creep" is currently non-existent, or at least unarticulated.3 8 Largely this is
because the natural forum for analyzing and critiquing the legal and
regulatory changes giving rise to this reality-the basic corporations law
school class-fails to raise or meaningfully discuss these developments.39
This permits corporate law to veer away from fundamental values. 40 This
Article suggests that the black box of corporate law controversies be
opened and that a full discussion of winners, losers, and policy underlying
the public corporation be discussed and debated.
Corporations constitute a key prop to a modem and dynamic capitalist
economy. Crucially, they operate to channel passive capital into
productive entrepreneurial and innovative conduct.4 1 In a capitalist system,
if corporations did not exist they would need to be invented.42 Some
commentators rightfully consider the public corporation to be one of the
greatest legal innovations in history.4 3 Rather than contesting this
assertion, this Article seeks to vindicate it by insisting upon a balanced
critique of the proper legal and regulatory definition of the public

CorporateLaw?, 57 EMORY L.J. 947 (2008) (examining the impact of corporate law on poverty, the
environment and labor).
38. Indeed, the Court previously has denied the corporation certain constitutional rights. See First
Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) ("Corporate identity has been
determinative in several decisions denying corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a
right to privacy . . .. Certain 'purely personal' guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the 'historic
function' of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals.") (citations
omitted).
39. As Professor Perea aptly asks, "When did 'thinking like a lawyer' come to require ignoring
important evidence . .. and avoiding rigorous analysis of the possible ramifications of that evidence?"
Perea, supra note 35, at 1149-50.
40. Thirty-one years ago a leading corporate law treatise raised questions about American
corporations and their relationship to the apartheid regime in South Africa. HENN & ALEXANDER,
supra note 32, at 32-33. Professor Lynne Dallas' textbook about law, policy and socioeconomics
explores the societal impact of business, economics and corporate decision-making and would enrich a
corporation's course. LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECoNOMIC APPROACH

(2005).
41. See Steven A. Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation (andRace) in America: Can Law (and
Professionalization)Fix "Minor" Problems of Externalization, Internalization, and Governance?, 79

ST. JOHN's L. REV. 977, 978-79 (2005) (arguing that the essential elements of the modem corporation
may maximize the flow of capital from passive investors to productive enterprises despite structural
problems).
42.

JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A

REVOLUTIONARY IDEA xv (2003) ("[The corporation is] the basis of the prosperity of the West and the
best hope for the future of the rest of the world.").
43. See,

e.g., 1

WILLIAM MEADE

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE

CORPORATIONS § 21 (1917) ("[T]he limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of
modem times . . . ." (quoting Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Columbia Univ., Address at the
143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911))).
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corporation. Because of its manifest importance, this critical approach
seeks to perfect the corporation, particularly its deeply suboptimal
governance frameworks."
This Article will unfold as follows: in Part II, the Article highlights the
continued domination of corporate governance by elite white males. Next,
in Part III, the Article will assess the impact of the new political power
granted public firms by the federal judiciary through its decision in
Citizens United.45 In Part IV, this Article will demonstrate the meaning of
the enhanced power of CEOs. Part V will discuss the role of the
corporation in managing prisons and public schools as an example of how
the relaxation of traditional constraints on corporate power have combined
for profoundly un-American outcomes: jailing citizens and educating
children for profit. Part VI will show the economic senselessness and
continuing reality of the Too Big To Fail ("TBTF") corporation.
The conclusion of the Article is that current corporate law pedagogy, as
evinced in widely adopted and longstanding texts that are published by
traditional law presses, avoids grappling with important issues in corporate
law: who actually controls corporations and why; whether corporations
should undertake traditional government functions for profit; the political
role of the corporation; and the recent devolution of law and regulation in
favor of corporate managers.46 In short, the public corporation in these
texts stands immune from critical analysis and should simply be accepted
as immutable. Evidence to the contrary is simply ignored.
We concede that the list of potential topics for discussion in a Business
Associations class is already impossibly crowded. But Business
Associations is a survey course, and the goals in this kind of law school
class include introducing students to a broad range of discourse about
large and small business organizations. Sometimes, Business Associations
professors must opt for breadth rather than depth when choosing what to
cover. Most important, a more balanced and inclusive text gives the law
professor who adopts it the ability to more easily choose the most
appropriate topics and perspectives for his or her students. This can be

44. E.g., Thomas Piketty et al., Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three
Elasticities, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y, Feb. 2014, at 230 (finding that the prevalence of CEO pay for
luck increases with lower tax rates as CEOs face greater incentives to use their power to enhance
compensation); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
Corporation, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 881 (1989) (arguing that proxy reform would resolve the governance
problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control).
45. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 428 (2010).
46. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xi-xxi (failing to provide critical analysis of corporations);
O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at ix-xxiv (same).
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done without having to resort to supplemental reading that students
consider onerous. The refusal to provide critical evidence and critical
analysis skews the business law education of U.S. law students and biases
the knowledge base of emerging lawyers and leaders. We conclude by
proposing a critical approach to corporate law pedagogy and scholarship.
II. THE PUBLIC CORPORATION AND WHITE MALE SUPREMACY

Virtually absent in all leading business law texts published by
traditional law presses is any discussion of the continuing dominance of
white male supremacy at all leadership levels of public corporations. 7
This occurs even though corporations profoundly influence the social
reality of race and class in the United States.48 In fact, the public
corporation is a key engine of racial disparities in economic outcomes in
America.4 9 Nothing illustrates this reality more powerfully than the
subprime mortgage crisis.so Most of the key players in the crisis operated
as public corporations subject to American corporate governance laws.
Numerous official inquiries have identified defective corporate
governance and risk management as a key cause of the subprime
debacle. 52

47. See EISENBERG & Cox, supra note 7, at v-xvii, 1080-84; KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xixxi; O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at ix-xxiv; see also RICHARD ZWEIGENHAFT & G.
WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE NEW CEOs: WOMEN, AFRICAN AMERICAN, LATINO, AND ASIAN AMERICAN

LEADERS OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES xii, xxiii (paperback ed. 2014) (showing that women and

minorities now lead only about 10 percent of the Fortune 500 as CEOs and hold only about 25 percent
of directorships despite comprising nearly 64 percent of the population).
48. For example, researchers found that tobacco firms competed to market menthol cigarettes in
poor minority communities, and this contributed to the racialized geography of today's tobacco-related
health disparities. Valerie B. Yerger et al., Racialized Geography, Corporate Activity, and Health
Disparities:Tobacco Industry Targeting of Inner Cities, J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED,
Nov. 2007, at 10.
49. Leadership positions at the top of the public corporation carry power, prestige and wealth, as
evidenced by the fact that about half of the top .01 percent of the income distribution consists of
corporate and financial elites. See supra note 5. CEO compensation, in particular, constitutes one of
the few positions where compensation can soar as high as $100 million or even over $1 billion per
annum. Strauss et al., supranote 4.
50. See Natasha Lennard, A Record High Wealth Gap Between Whites and Minorities, SALON
(July 26, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/3N8Q-AAY7.
51. FCIC REPORT, supranote 26, at xvii ("The very nature of many Wall Street firms changedfrom relatively staid private partnerships to publicly traded corporations taking greater and more
diverse kinds of risks."). The FCIC highlights "stunning" corporate governance failures at AIG,
Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae and Citigroup, each of which was a publicly traded corporation. Id. at xix.
52. See supra note 26. See also S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 65-68 (Comm. Print 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/8BS-CC4T [hereinafter Levin-Coburn Report] (finding that Washington Mutual
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The subprime crisis caused the most massive destruction and transfer
of wealth in U.S. history.s3 That wealth transfer-from Main Street
taxpayers to Wall Street bankers, executives and investors-ultimately led
to the highest recorded racial wealth gap in recent U.S. history. 54 "By one
measure, the white-to-black median wealth ratio increased from eleven to
one in 2005 to twenty to one in 2009. By this same measure, the white-toHispanic median wealth ratio increased from seven to one in 2005 to
eighteen to one in 2009."" Naturally, these devastating changes in
household wealth caused by the subprime mortgage fiasco result in fewer
educational opportunities, less secure retirements, less economic mobility,
and a lower quality of life in minority communities.
The financial crisis also spawned differential outcomes in income
status. "[B]y one measure, African Americans and Hispanics as a whole
were downwardly mobile and net losers in terms of their income status
during the period of 2001-2011, while whites were net winners." And,
the gap between white unemployment and minority unemployment
reached higher levels after the crisis than before the crisis. More
Americans of color live in poverty today as a direct result. When
compared to white Americans, twice as many Americans of color live in

("WaMu") embarked on high-risk mortgage lending in early 2005, even as the bank's own Chief Risk
Officer stated that the condition of the housing market signifies a "bubble" with risks that "will come
back to haunt us" and that WaMu forged ahead despite repeated warnings that the risks were
excessive, its lending standards and risk management systems were deficient, and many of its loans
were tainted by fraud.). The Levin-Coburn report found that WaMu was typical of home mortgage
lenders in terms of risk. Id. at 4.
53. According to National Public Radio (NPR):
[Tihe proximate cause of the Great Recession was the collapse of the housing market. When
things went south, blacks and Latinos-who had more of their family wealth wrapped up in
housing -were absolutely throttled. Blacks lost half of their household wealth, Latinos lost
two-thirds, and home ownership rates fell to numbers not seen since the Reagan era.
Gene Demby, What Do We Do About America's Racial Wealth Gap?, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Apr. 30,
2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/04/30/179907029/what-do-we-do-about-americasracial-wealth-gap.
54. See SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN ET AL., URBAN INST., LESS THAN EQUAL: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN WEALTH ACCUMULATION 1 (2013), archivedat http://perma.cc/TDH4-PZU2.

55. Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 How. L.J. 849, 858
(2013) (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR., TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS
BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS, 7,14 (2011), archivedathttp://perma.cc/4QL8-46S2).

56. See id. at 861-68.
57.

Id. at 851 (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR., FEWER, POORER, GLOOMIER: THE LOST DECADE OF

THE MIDDLE CLASS, 12 (2012), archivedat http://perma.cc/M4B6-RPTE).
58. In 2011, the white unemployment rate was 7.9 percent lower than the black unemployment
rate and 3.6 percent lower than the Hispanic unemployment rate. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2011 41 tbl.12 (2012), archived at

http://perma.cc/8TG7-4PSQ. In contrast, in 2001, the white unemployment rate was 4.4 percent lower
than the black unemployment rate and 2.4 percent lower than the Hispanic unemployment rate. Id.
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poverty.59 Even more troubling is the fact that 37.9 percent of African
American children now live in poverty and 33.8 percent of Hispanic
children live in poverty.60 A more economically senseless destruction of
human capital is difficult to imagine.
This economic inequality was no accident. Flawed corporate law,
governance and policy played a major role. 61 For example, executives
were able to harvest huge gains at the expense of shareholders and the
disempowered, as well as society in general.62 Predatory lenders targeted
the most unsophisticated borrowers, who, historically, have been denied
access to capital and credit, for noxious home loans.6 ' A Federal Reserve
study found that predatory lenders frequently targeted less educated
Americans.64 Another study by the Wall Street Journal found that of all
subprime borrowers, 61 percent of them actually qualified for prime
loans.6 ' The most nefarious of the subprime lending was concentrated
largely in areas that had sizeable minority populations.6 6 The high up-front
fees and interest costs associated with subprime loans accelerated
executive compensation even while leading to higher borrower-default

59. In 2011, 12.8 percent of whites lived in poverty while 27.6 percent of blacks and 25.3% of
Hispanics lived in poverty. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 14 tbl.3 (2012),

available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.
60.

Valerie Strauss, New Census Data: Children Remain America's Poorest Citizens, WASH.

POST: THE ANSWER SHEET BLOG (Sept. 17, 2013, 5:26 PM), archived http://perma.cc/KJW5-29ZF
("Those hardest hit are children of color: 37.9 percent of black children lived in poverty in 2012, and
33.8 percent of Hispanics did as well. Compare that to 12.3 percent for white, non-Hispanic
children.").
61.

See PIKETTY, supranote 5, at 302.

62. We were warned, albeit not through corporate law casebooks. No less an authority than Fed
Chair Alan Greenspan stated in 2002, in reference to the Enron scandals, that CEOs would seek to
harvest gains without respect to shareholder value. FED. RESERVE BOARD'S SEMIANNUAL MONETARY

POL'Y REP. TO THE CONG. (July 16, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/4XQB-MREA (testimony of
Chairman Alan Greenspan) (stating that lax corporate governance law contributed to CEO primacy
and permitted CEOs to "harvest" illicit gains through manipulation of stock prices).
63.

Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure

Crisis, 10 Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 168 n.128 (2009) ("The mortgage foreclosure crisis was driven not
by lending to poor people, but by lending to poor people with terms designed to extract short term
profits through abusive fees.").
64. See generally Kristopher Gerardi et al., Financial Literacy and Subprime Mortgage
Delinquency: Evidencefrom a Survey Matched to Administrative Data (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
Working Paper No. 2010-10, Apr. 2010), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/pubs/wp/
wpl010.pdf.
65. Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 3, 2007, at Al.
66. Elvin Wyly et al., Cartographiesof Race and Class: Mapping the Class-Monopoly Rents of
American Subprime Mortgage Capital, 33 INT'L J. URBAN & REGIONAL RES. 332, 339-40 (2009)

(finding that subprime lending was concentrated in areas with high prime loan rejection rates and areas
of historic minority marginalization such as the Texas border area).
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levels. 67 Overwhelming evidence demonstrates that much of the crisis was

rooted in widespread race-based subprime lending to non-subprime
borrowers of color.68
All the while, corporations and their executives profited from this
subprime lending. Take Countrywide Financial Corp., for example.
Countrywide paid CEO Angelo Mozilo $102 million in 2006 and $229
million in 2007, including $127 million that Mozilo reaped from
exercising stock options in 2007, the same year that Countrywide
announced massive mortgage losses. 69 The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission ("FCIC"), a congressionally authorized commission charged
with investigating the financial crisis, found that as early as 2006, Mozilo
termed Countrywide's subprime loans "poison" and "toxic," and stated
they were likely to lead to bankruptcy.70 Countrywide ultimately settled
predatory lending claims for $8.4 billion, the largest predatory lending
settlement in history7 Meanwhile, Angelo Mozilo and others settled
securities fraud claims with the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") for over $70 million--essentially for selling shares to the
investing public without disclosing the "poisonous" lending at
Countrywide.7 2 Mozilo, however, personally only paid $22.5 million of

67. High-cost subprime loans default at eight times the default rate on prime loans, even after
controlling for credit characteristics. CLAUDIA COULTON ET AL., CTR. ON URBAN POVERTY & CMTY.
DEV., PATHWAYS TO FORECLOSURE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF MORTGAGE LOANS, CLEVELAND

AND CUYAHOGA COUNTY, 2005-2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://blog.case.edu/msass/2008/06/23/
Pathwaysto foreclosure 6_23.pdf.
68. For example, a recent study found:
Consistent with previous research, blacks and Latinos were more likely and Asians less likely
to receive subprime loans than whites were. Income was positively associated with receipt of
subprime loans for minorities, whereas the opposite was true for whites. When expensive
(jumbo) loans were excluded from the sample, regressions found an even stronger, positive
association between income and subprime likelihood for minorities, supporting the theory
that wealthier minorities were targeted for subprime loans when they could have qualified for
prime loans.
Jacob W. Faber, Racial Dynamics of Subprime Mortgage Lending at the Peak, 23 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 328, 329 (2013). See also RAMIREZ, supra note 2, at 147-51 (collecting studies).
69. James L. Bicksler, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Its Linkages to Corporate
Governance, 5 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 295, 296-97 (2008).

70. FCIC REPORT, supranote 26, at 20.
71. Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2008, at Bl.
72. Press Release, SEC, Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo to Pay SEC's Largest-Ever
Financial Penalty Against a Public Company's Senior Executive (Oct. 15, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/3YC3-A5V2 (noting that the SEC settled based upon allegations that Mozilo (and
others) "failed to disclose to investors the significant credit risk that Countrywide was taking on as a
result of its efforts to build and maintain market share" and that "Mozilo engaged in insider trading in
the securities of Countrywide by establishing four 10b5-1 sales plans in October, November, and
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the settlement.73 The Mozilo and Countrywide fraud demonstrate the
flawed legal structure of the public firm that permitted, even facilitated,
the ability of CEOs and other senior executives to profit mightily from
predatory and race-based lending while defrauding the public.74
What would have happened if corporate leadership in America
embraced and reflected diversity? Could these kinds of catastrophic losses
for society, communities of color, and shareholders have been averted?
Recent empirical studies demonstrate that firms with diverse boards
suffered fewer subprime losses during the mortgage meltdown.7 1 Still,

despite evidence that meaningfully diverse boardrooms improve corporate
governance and bestow significant financial benefits, the apex of
77
corporate leadership remains a bastion of white male supremacy.
A survey of the demographic make-up of corporate leadership reveals
continued white male privilege rather than the operation of competitive
meritocracy. 8 Fifty years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964," which
formally outlawed racial and gender discrimination, the commanding
heights of the American economy still look more like an old boys' club

December 2006 while he was aware of material, non-public information concerning Countrywide's
increasing credit risk").
73.

Walter Hamilton & E. Scott Reckard, Angelo Mozilo, Other Former Countrywide Execs

Settle FraudCharges, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/58U7-YKGU.
74.

See Gretchen Morgenson, Gimme Back Your Paycheck: After the Losses, Who Shares the

Pain?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at BUI ("Executives at seven major financial institutions that have
collapsed, were sold at distressed prices or are in deep to the taxpayer received $464 million in
performance pay since 2005" even while their shareholders suffered staggering losses).
75. E.g., Maureen I. Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board Configuration Matter? The
Case of US Subprime Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L. REV. 405, 405 (2011) ("We find
that the board configurations of those financial institutions that engaged in subprime lending were
significantly different from those that did not. Specifically, subprime lenders had boards that were
busier, had less tenure and were less diverse with respect to gender."); Marion Hutchinson et al., Who
Selects the 'Right' Directors?An Examination of the Association Between Board Selection, Gender

Diversity and Outcomes, 55 ACCT. & FIN. (forthcoming 2015) (finding that Australian companies with
"greater gender diversity moderate[d] excessive firm risk which in turn improve[d] firms' financial
performance").

76. See RAMIREZ, supra note 2, at 145-47 (citing authorities which find diversity improves
boardroom performance).
77. As will be discussed in the next section the problem is essentially that CEOs exercise too
much control over the public firm's proxy solicitation, which they continue to use to control board
composition and indirectly their compensation. See Ramirez, supra note 8, at 1600-12 (collecting
authorities that demonstrate link between director and CEO affinity and compensation); Richard Clune
et al., The Nominating Committee Process: A Qualitative Examination of Board Independence and
Formalization, 31 J. CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 748 (2014) (finding that CEOs continue to exercise

influence over director nominations notwithstanding nominally independent nominating committees).
78. See generally ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES: WOMEN AND MINORITIES

ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS (2013), available at http://theabd.org/2012_ABD%2OMissing Pieces
Final_8_15_13.pdf.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2006 & Supp. V. 2011).
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than a thriving modem capitalistic meritocracy.80 Only a genuine or
unintended belief in white male supremacy can ignore the fact that

meaningful racial, gender, or worldview diversity has failed to take hold in
the modern corporate governance of the public firm."
For example, according to one recent survey, males hold over 80
percent of Fortune 100 board seats and whites hold nearly 85 percent of
such seats.82 At Fortune 500 firms these numbers increase to nearly 85
percent and 87 percent, respectively.83 Progress for women and minorities
on this front continues at a glacial pace, as women and minorities
accounted for only 26.7 percent of all seats in 2012 at Fortune 500 firms,
barely more than the 25.5 percent seen in 2010.84 Women and minorities
continue to be dramatically underrepresented at all leadership levels of the
world's most powerful public corporations.
While public firms in the U.S. lag, diversity in the boardroom
commands the attention of lawmakers in other parts of the world. For
example, in 2003, Norway imposed quotas requiring that women occupy
40 percent of the board seats of public firms. 8 6 Other countries followed
suit shortly thereafter.87 The EU proposed a directive in 2012 requiring
that 40 percent of non-executive directors on corporate boards be female
by January 1, 2020. Diversity in the boardroom, thus, is a global issue.

80. See Gary Strauss, Good Old Boys' Network Still Rules CorporateBoards, USA TODAY, Nov.
1, 2002, at IB (quoting Stephen Baum, CEO of Sempra Energy, that board diversity "provides
diversity of opinion and a different perspective. It causes us to think a little more. The quality of our
decision-making is better. If we were all right-wing Republicans, we might miss opportunities.").
81. Professor Cheryl Wade states the reality well:
[C]orporate diversity discussions are misleading because they imply that companies work
hard to ensure race and gender equity.... The implied contextual message, however, is that it
may be true that many men and whites are promoted more frequently and earn more, but
these decisions are based on merit. The implication is that even with diversity training,
diversity officers, and codes of conduct that prohibit discrimination, whites and males climb
to the top of the corporate hierarchy anyway. It is an implied message of white male
supremacy.
Cheryl L. Wade, TransformingDiscriminatory Corporate Cultures: This Is Not Just Women's Work,

65 MD. L. REV. 346, 349, 372 (2006).
82.

ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, supra note 78, at 2 fig. 1.

83. Id. at 7 fig.7.
84. Id. at 7.
85. According to the most recent census data, non-Hispanic whites now constitute only 63
percent of the U.S. population and are declining. Hope Yen, Census: White Majority in U.S. Gone by
2043, NBC NEWS (June 13, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/W593-M4PW. Thus, white males
constitute only about 30 percent of the general population but hold nearly 75 percent of the board
seats.
86.

Fawn Lee, Note, Show Me the Money: Using the Business Case Rationale to Justify Gender

Targets in the EU, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1471, 1488 (2013).
87. Id at 1492-94.
88. Id. at 1494-96.
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Lawmakers in the U.S. recently acted to encourage diversity on
corporate boards, among senior executives, and in the corporate world in
general. In 2009, the SEC imposed disclosure requirements on public
firms to state the role of diversity in the board nomination process.89 More
recently, federal banking regulators in the U.S. released a joint rulemaking
initiative requiring virtually all financial institutions to embrace diversity
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act9 ("Dodd-Frank Act").91 These recent legislative and regulatory
changes supplement already-existing anti-discrimination law that
indirectly encourages business leaders to embrace diversity.92
Lawmakers undertook these initiatives as a result of increased
acceptance of a business rationale in support of diversity.93 Diversity
extends greater informational elaboration to firms. 94 More diverse boards
can draw upon distinct perspectives and experiences.95 As a result,
89. SEC Diversity Disclosure Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2011); Proxy Disclosure
Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (requiring disclosure of diversity policies in
corporations).
90. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
91. Proposed Interagency Policy Statement Establishing Joint Standards for Assessing the
Diversity Policies and Practices of Entities Regulated by the Agencies and Request for Comment, 78
Fed. Reg. 64052 (Oct. 25, 2013). See also Dodd-Frank Act § 342 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5452(a)(1)).
92. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (holding that "an employer is
vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative
defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim").
Naturally, policies that impose and enforce an obligation to embrace diversity upon all employees
would satisfy the affirmative defense articulated in Faragher.See El-Bakly v. Autozone, Inc., No. 04
C 2767, 2008 WL 1774962 at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("Given the law in this area, the Court agrees that
the signed diversity mission statements are relevant to a potential affirmative defense for Defendant
AutoZone, because they might support a finding that Defendant AutoZone exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly the harassing behavior.").
93. E.g., Toyah Miller & Maria del Carmen Triana, Demographic Diversity in the Boardroom:
Mediators of the Board Diversity-Firm Performance Relationship, 46 J. MGMT. STUD. 755, 755
(2009) (finding in a sample of Fortune 500 firms "a positive relationship between board racial diversity
and both firm reputation and innovation. We find that reputation and innovation both partially mediate
the relationship between board racial diversity and firm performance. In addition, we find a positive
relationship between board gender diversity and innovation."); Niclas L. Erhardt et al., Board of
Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE 102, 102 (2003)

("Correlation and regression analyses indicate board diversity is positively associated with these
financial indicators of firm performance.").
94. Of course, cognitive diversity and information elaboration is not limited to diverse cultural
perspectives or experiences associated with race or gender. See, e.g., Lubomir P. Litov et al., Lawyers
and Fools: Lawyer-Directorsin Public Corporations, 102 GEO. L.J. 413 (2014) (finding that lawyerdirectors add diversity to the board, give the board access to more elaborate information, and thereby
add value).
95. Miller & del Carmen Triana, supra note 93, at 775 ("These findings suggest that firms may
benefit from the diverse human and social capital on diverse boards . . . because racial and gender
diversity (proxies for richness of information in the decision-making process) are both related to
innovation.") (citations omitted).
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Diversity
diversity enjoys a powerful association with innovation.
logically operates to effectively counter groupthink as well as affinity bias
and thereby proves to be particularly relevant in the boardroom.97 More
diverse groups often hold dissimilar views, even on basic issues such as
risk.9 8 Although, as might be expected, evidence is not uniform, there is
strong empirical evidence that supports the tangible business benefits of
diversity in the boardroom.99
Notwithstanding the empirical strength of the business case for
diversity in the boardroom, mainstream corporate law casebooks ignore
the issue altogether.100 Finance and economics scholars research and write
about diversity, and many reports support diversity in the corporate
boardroom. However, the authors and publishers of mainstream casebooks
simply omit this discourse. 10 ' The authors of these texts overlook the
actions of the SEC,1 02 the federal banking authorities,1 0 3 Congress,1 04 and
other lawmaking bodies to improve diversity in U.S. corporate
boardrooms and the public sector. 0 5 The leading corporate law texts

96.

Mariateresa Torchia et al., Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to

Critical Mass, 102 J. Bus. ETHICS 299, 299 (2011) (conducting tests on 317 Norwegian firms and
finding "that attaining critical mass-going from one or two women (a few tokens) to at least three
women (consistent minority)-makes it possible to enhance the level of firm innovation.").
97.

Regina F. Burch,

Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity

Rationale, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 594 (2011) ("This Article proposes that greater worldview
diversity on corporate boards may lead to better governance and mitigate bias and unfairness in
corporate decision making.").
98. Id at 610 (citing Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition:Explaining
the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 466 (2007)).
99. Compare CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE

PERFORMANCE 12 (2012) (finding enhanced board diversity was associated with a 26 percent gain in
corporate valuation from 2005 to 2012), with Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Signaling Through Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 433-34 (2008)
(discussing gaps in empirical evidence of business benefits). Diversity gains seem particularly robust
when a board achieves a critical mass of diverse directors rather than just tokenism. E.g., Jasmin
Joecks et al., Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a

"Critical Mass? ", 118 J. Bus. ETHICS 61 (2013) (finding evidence that critical mass of gender
diversity is associated with higher financial performance).

100. See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 1470-71, 1472, 1482 (failing to mention diversity or
demographic characteristics of board or management in index); O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note
7, at 1169-75 (same); CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1157-1170 (same); KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7,

at 895-928 (same); EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 635-39 (same).
101. See Fields & Keys, supranote 6.
102. See supranote 89.
103. See supranote 91.
104. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 342 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5452(a)(1)).
105. Not one of the leading texts studied even mentions the word diversity either in the context of
&

the corporate boardroom or as important from a profit maximizing perspective. See EISENBERG
Cox, supra note 7, at 1470, 1485; CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1160-61; O'KELLEY & THOMPSON,
supra note 7, at 1169-1175; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 147-57; KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at
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certainly need not accept uncritically the benefits of diversity; but
completely ignoring the debate as if it is nonexistent does a disservice to
both law students and a society mired in racial privilege and
disempowerment.1 06 Indeed, these texts implicitly accommodate the racial
pseudo-science of yesteryear that white male domination is not just
acceptable but natural and unworthy of critique or analysis.
While each of the leading corporate casebooks disregards critical
assessment of corporate leadership and diversity goals, there are some
meager exceptions. To its credit, the Choper text Cases and Material on
Corporationsat least acknowledges that the boardrooms of public firms in
America may be culturally monolithic. 0 7 But even Choper fails to discuss
any reason for this continued exclusion of diverse voices from the
boardroom or critically examine why this remains true in the modern U.S.
economy. 08 Students are given no context for this homogeneity, no
evidence demonstrating the benefits of diversity, and are essentially
invited to conclude that white male supremacy is simply the natural order
of American society. 0 9 At the very least there is a manifest failure of the
primary business law text authors to voice any objection to the continued
over-representation of white males in the boardroom." 0

895-928. Compare this absence of discussion with the actual approach of the financial world.
Barclay's recently launched an investment fund that seeks to capitalize upon the financial edge
enjoyed by diverse firms. Michael Leibel, Barclays Launches Women in LeadershipIndex and ETms,
REUTERS (July 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YAA5-JW9W.
106. As Professor Wade highlights:
In the business setting, the equitable treatment of women and people of color depends on
the commitment of corporate officers, directors, managers, and senior executives, almost all
of whom are white and male. In spite of the difficulties inherent in discussing racism and
sexism, it is important that the discourse not occur among women and people of color only.
Whites and men must participate, and the discourse should start in law-school classes about
business and corporate govemance.
Cheryl L. Wade, Teaching Gender as a Core Value in Business OrganizationsClass, 36 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REv. 545, 549 (2011).
107. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 10 (stating that boards remain populated "primarily" by
white males).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Progressive corporate law scholars have long argued that the continuation of white male
supremacy at the apex of the public corporation is totally without justification and that diversity is
associated with a variety of business justifications. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, No SEAT AT THE
TABLE: How CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 151
(2007) ("The scarcity of women in corporate governance roles is curious, because women have been
entering the professional and managerial ranks in great numbers for nearly three decades now."); Lisa
M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89 N.C. L. REv. 855, 884
(2011) ("However, the empirical evidence suggests that the increased reliance on the business case has
not translated into any appreciable gains in board diversity. Instead, there has been a relative
stagnation in board diversity efforts even as more corporations and regulators appear willing to
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The Klein text Business Associations: Cases and Materials on Agency,
Partnership, and Corporations, arguably the most widely adopted
Business Associations textbook on the market, makes no mention of
diversity or the fact that board and executive leadership is dominated by
privileged white males.' By ignoring this important corporate
governance issue, the Klein authors leave law professors who adopt their
text completely adrift on this matter, forcing them to manufacture
meaningful classroom conversation in connection with diversity in the
boardroom and its proper place in corporate governance policymaking." 2
Most professors using this text are forced to leave the subject
unconsidered and students uninformed.
The O'Kelley business law text, Corporations and Other Business
Associations: Cases and Materials, potentially opens a door to concrete
discussion of board and executive makeup in connection with race and
gender, but then slams the door abruptly by eschewing the opportunity to
critically assess the monolithic makeup of corporate leadership."'
Disappointingly, the text pays only passing lip service to gender diversity
by describing the CEO as "she" when differentiating between officers and
directors, no doubt well understanding that only 22 of Fortune 500 CEOs
(4 percent) are female.1 4 The text, however, provides no further critical
analysis as to why the corporate boardrooms and corner offices continue to
be dominated by entrenched white males in the United States.1s
None of the other leading corporations' texts mentions the domination
of white males at the apex of the public firm, the potential benefits of
cultural and worldview diversity, or the manifest costs of the corporations'
presumed racially neutral structures." 6 Exacerbating the problem of white

rhetorically embrace the business case."); Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Corporate Boardroom: Still a
Male Club, 33 J. CORP. L. 665, 679-80 (2008) ("Too often, directors follow the path of least resistance
and nominate their acquaintances with whom they feel comfortable and these candidates necessarily
often resemble the incumbent directors in terms of gender, race, social status, background, and
experience."); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perilsof Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
1233, 1241 (2003) (arguing that diversity can stem groupthink which arises from homogeneity).
111. See KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 907-09.

112. Law professor adopters of Klein are seemingly forced to shoehorn considerations of board
diversity into existing text sections on board duties (Chapter 5), including perhaps the duty of care.
One can imagine how this results in awkward syllabus construction and, at many times, leaves students
with the false impression that the subject is unimportant or ultra vires for purposes of corporate law
study. This has been the experience of two authors of this Article, and likely countless law professors
around the country.
113. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 150-51.
114. ZWEIGENHAFT & DOMHOFF, supra note 47, at xii.
115. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 151.

116. See supranote 100.
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male domination in the corporate boardroom is the new electioneering
power granted this powerful, but culturally monolithic, group by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Citizens United. Indeed, the upper
echelons of the public corporation may well qualify as one of the most
enduring bastions of white male supremacy in the U.S.
III. CITIZENS UNITED AND THE NEW POLITICAL POWER OF THE PUBLIC
FIRM

On January 10, 2010, the United States Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.'17 The Court
ruled that corporations enjoy the same free speech rights as individuals,
and therefore, governmental restrictions on a corporation's political speech
must survive strict scrutiny, the most demanding level of judicial review
of governmental actions."' More specifically, the Court held that
corporations are entitled to first amendment free speech protections, and as
a result, corporate money spent on political electioneering independent of
a campaign cannot be limited by campaign finance restrictions.' 19
Previously, corporate funds could not be used for electioneering purposes,
forcing CEOs and corporate leaders to finance politicking for their chosen
candidates from their own capital (typically through Political Action
Committees ("PACs")). 120 Now, CEOs and corporate leadership can
essentially use corporate monies in an unfettered manner to campaign for
and help elect the political candidates of their choice.121

117. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
118. Id. at 342-43.
119. Id at 372 (holding 2 U.S.C. § 441b's restriction of corporate independent electioneering
expenditures unconstitutional). The Court ultimately overruled two of its precedents on this point. Id.
at 365-66. The statutory section found unconstitutional was part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 8, 18, 28, 36, and
47 U.S.C).
120. See generally Bret Shaw, Note, It's the End of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine):
&

How Comparative Campaign Finance Suggests that Citizens United May Not Be the End of the
World.. . and that the United States Should Consider OtherPolicy Alternatives, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L

COMP. L. 159, 161-64 (2014) (describing the evolution of regulating corporate political activity).
121. Shareholders have no power to influence the management of the corporation under state law
and are generally limited to voting for directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011)
("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors . ... "); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011) ("[A]n
annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors . .. ."). High profile corporate
law experts almost immediately attacked the Court's decision because it misapprehended the nature of
the corporation as an instrument of public policy with no inherent powers not ceded by the state for
public purposes. See, e.g., Robert A.G. Monks, CorporateGovernance Redux in the Light of Citizens
United, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 7, 2010, 9:24 AM), archived at

http://perma.cc/JG2T-9YL5.
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This change in law represents a massive transfer of political power
from ordinary citizens to the CEOs of the most colossal capital
aggregations in the history of the world.122 Modem public corporations in
America hold value approaching $20 trillion.1 23 One U.S. Senator stated
that the Citizens United ruling has moved the U.S. toward an economic
and political oligarchy whereby a small handful of "billionaire families"
control the economy and political system.1 2 4 Another former Senator
reflected upon the scale of resources available to public corporations and
described the decision's implications as "scary."0 2 5 A leading election law
scholar called the day the opinion was issued "a very bad day for
American democracy."1 2 6
CEOs' power over the political activities of the corporation is now
unlimited. Surprisingly, there is no mandatory disclosure obligation of a
public firm's political activities.1 27 There is no enforceable mandate that
the CEO consider shareholder interests when deploying for political ends
the extraordinary capital available to the public firm.1 2 8 It is virtually

122. See Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical
Analysis of Independent PoliticalSpending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 316 (2014) ("Indeed, during the 2012
federal election cycle, independent spending related to all federal races exceeded $I billion, which was
approximately three times more than spending in 2008 and approximately six times more than
spending in 2004."). Professors Spencer and Wood examined those states whose election laws were
most affected by Citizens United. They found that independent corporate electioneering expenditures
in state elections since Citizens United doubled. Id at 361 ("[W]e . . . systematically examined the
effect of [Citizens United] on spending at the state level. We found that independent spending
increased at twice the rate in states whose laws were affected by the decision.").
123. The current total market value of publicly traded firms in the US amounts to $19.8 trillion.
WILSHIRE,

THE WILSHIRE

5000 TOTAL

MARKET

INDEX:

FUNDAMENTAL

http://web.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html
archivedat http://perma.cc/T5MS-DXRK.
124.

CHARACTERISTICS,

(last visited Dec. 4, 2014),

Natasha Bach, Bernie Sanders: Citizens United Is Creating An 'Oligarchic Form Of

Society', HUFF. POST (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:04 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/5Q95-KN97.
125. Bob Kerrey, The Senator from Exxon-Mobil?, HUFF. POST (Mar. 23, 2010, 5:12 AM),
archivedat http://perma.cc/8BEP-R5W3 ("With $85 billion in profits during the 2008 election, Exxon
Mobil would have been able to fully fund over 65,000 winning campaigns for U.S. House or outspend
every candidate by a factor of 90 to 1. That's a scary proposition when you consider that the health of
our planet is at stake.").
126. Rick Hasen, Citizens United: What Happens Next?, HUFF. POST (Mar. 23, 2010, 5:12 AM),
archivedat http://perma.cc/JX92-VMGB.
127. Delaware law fails to even authorize political expenditures much less regulate them. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2011) (detailed listing of corporate powers without authorizing political
contributions and activities).

128. At best, the campaign expenditures and political activity of a CEO is subject to review only
under the very promiscuous business judgment rule, which only imposes fiduciary duty liability for
gross negligence-meaning egregious, near intentional wrongdoing. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom,

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (imposing liability upon finding that the CEO negotiated sale of company
without authority from board, settled upon a price without basis and without expert analysis, signed
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impossible for shareholders to hold corporate leaders accountable in this
context, even if executives put their personal interests before those of the
corporation and its shareholders. In order to enforce fiduciary duties owed
to the corporation, a shareholder must proceed derivatively and can
generally only do so upon a showing of bad faith.1 29 Indeed, state law
provisions that effectively abolished the duty of care for most public
corporations fail to provide means to hold directors accountable even
when they act recklessly.1 3 0 These statutes typically require a showing of
"conscious disregard" of duty.' 3 ' Thus, the Supreme Court through
Citizens United expanded the power of CEOs, already insulated under
statutory law, to use shareholder wealth-and to thereby coerce
shareholder speech-to further management's political goals with little or
no accountability.1 32
In fact, while state law generally takes great care to delineate the power
of the corporation, those powers generally do not include the power to

merger agreement without reading document, and failed to assure that board conditions to transaction
were properly secured).
129. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006) ("Accordingly, we hold that the
Court of Chancery properly . . . dismissed the plaintiffs' derivative complaint for failure to excuse
demand by alleging particularized facts that created reason to doubt whether the directors had acted in
good faith in exercising their oversight responsibilities."); Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, , 1044, 1054 n.37 (Del. 2004) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
815 (Del. 1984) ("[Iln the demand context even proof of majority ownership of a company does not
strip the directors of the presumptions of independence, and that their acts have been taken in good
faith and in the best interests of the corporation. There must be coupled with the allegation of control
such facts as would demonstrate that through personal or other relationships the directors are beholden
to the controlling person.")) (dismissing derivative action).
130. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (authorizing an exculpatory provision in a
corporation's articles of incorporation for money damages for "acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law"). See also Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Why IDo Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REv. 477, 490 (2000) (finding that 98% of
sampled Fortune 500 companies that incorporated under state laws that permit insulation of directors
for duty-of-care liability had adopted insulating charter provisions, and that 100% of Delaware firms
sampled had adopted such provisions).
131. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 63, 67 (Del. 2006) (holding that a
"conscious disregard of one's responsibilities" shows bad faith for purposes of director liability).
132. See discussion of CEO primary infra Part IV. See also Miller, supra note 8, at 91. In his
opinion, Justice Stevens articulated the point:
It is an interesting question "who" is even speaking when a business corporation places
an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate. Presumably it is not the
customers or employees, who typically have no say in such matters. It cannot realistically be
said to be the shareholders, who tend to be far removed from the day-to-day decisions of the
firm and whose political preferences may be opaque to management. Perhaps the officers or
directors of the corporation have the best claim to be the ones speaking ....
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 467 (Stevens, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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influence politicians and elections."' Only the U.S. Supreme Court
endows these artificial legal fictions with such power. 3 4 Historically, the
corporation existed as a matter of the state's imperative to facilitate
35
macroeconomic growth.s
This implied concentrated economic power,
and legislatures exercised caution accordingly, limiting the power of the
corporation by imposing limits on its duration, number of shareholders,
capitalization, and powers.' 36 There is no evidence, however, that at the
framing of the U.S. Constitution anyone contemplated that the corporation
would act as a key political player that is controlled almost entirely by the
CEO. 37
Noted constitutional law scholars have raised important objections to
allowing CEOs to plumb shareholder wealth to fund their political
objectives.' 3 ' They note that the Supreme Court's expansion of the power
of corporate managers to use shareholder wealth for management's
political agenda is at odds with the Court's insistence that unions be
deprived of the same power with respect to union members.' 39 These
scholars also recognize that the Court could have easily resolved the
compelled speech issue with respect to shareholders simply by mandating
institutional assurances that shareholders have some voice in the
expenditure of their wealth by corporate leadership for political

133. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2011).
134. Leading texts of decades past wrestled only with the charitable donations that corporations
made and did not contemplate them as political actors. LArnN, supra note 32, at § 64. Indeed, the
nature of the historic roots of the corporation was that the sovereign dispensed concessions to the
corporation as its creator and that these could contravene constitutional rights. Id. § 174-75.
135. Thus, corporations existed in England and the American colonies to generate revenue for the
government and assist in the creation of infrastructure such as bridges, roads, ferries, wharfs, banks,
water suppliers and other basic public goods. Id. § 175.
136. Id. § 54.
137. Prior to the Constitution only about 30 special purpose corporations even existed in the
American colonies. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 24. General incorporation statutes did not
appear until 1795 (with many restrictions) and broad general business corporations did not exist until
the late 19th century. Id. at 24-27. See also Carol R. Goforth, "A CorporationHas No Soul"-Modern
Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Involvement in the PoliticalProcess, 47 HOus. L. REv.

617, 659 (2010) ("Given the accepted notion that the Framers were indeed concerned with individual
rights, they never would have contemplated giving [modern public corporations] free speech rights.").
138. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, PoliticalSpeech and Association Rights
After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1023, 1024-25 (2013) ("When the Supreme
Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that corporations have a First Amendment right to make
unlimited, independent campaign expenditures, it dismissed in a few sentences the idea that the
corporate leadership's use of corporate resources on politics might infringe the rights of dissenting
shareholders.").
139. Id. at 1026 ("The dissimilar treatment of unions as compared to almost all other organizations
for purposes of the compelled speech restriction on associational free speech rights cannot be justified
by law or logic.").

2014]

CRITICAL CORPORATE LAW PEDAGOGY

421

purposes.140 Instead, the Court's mandate that state-created artificial
entities enjoy First Amendment speech rights to spend shareholder money
for electioneering simply shifted massive political power to CEOs.
The Supreme Court's holding in Citizens United invited leading
corporate law scholars to address the issue of compelled speech of
shareholders and the crafting of innovative structural adaptations to
address this issue. Some scholars answered the call admirably.141 These
commentators urge more robust accountability of managers, under
traditional fiduciary duties, for political expenditures.1 4 2 Fundamentally,
however, the issue is a more urgent incarnation of a longstanding
corporate governance and shareholder concern: "how to ensure that [a]
corporation['s] political activities are actually in the interest of
shareholders."l 43
Consider the observations made in the preceding paragraphs along with
the dearth of women or minority leaders who are CEOs or on boards of
Fortune 500 companies. It becomes clear that the new political and
economic power granted to CEOs and boards by Citizens United is simply
a grant of additional power to entrenched white males and the white male
perspective that has dominated economic policy in the United States for so
long.1 4 4 Put simply, the Supreme Court transferred power from the diverse
body politic as a whole to a small handful of non-diverse corporate elites.
Consider also one disturbing example of a CEO's abuse of the power
given to corporate executives under Citizens United. The CEO of Massey
Coal in West Virginia hand-picked a West Virginia Supreme Court
judicial candidate, used corporate funds to see him elected, and then
reaped the reward when that judge cast the deciding vote in a case that
spared Massey Coal from a $50 million verdict for allegedly interfering

140. Id. at 1023 ("Nor does it consider what kinds of internal organizational governance
mechanisms are necessary to ensure a fair allocation of speech protections between those who wish the
organization to promote one message and those who wish it to promote another.").
141. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARv. L. REV. 83, 117 (2010) ("We have put forward rules based on a combination of
shareholder voting, oversight by independent directors, and detailed transparency requirements that
include robust disclosure of spending through intermediaries.").
142. See, e.g., William Alan Nelson II, Esq., Post-Citizens United: Using Shareholder Derivative
Claims of Corporate Waste to Challenge Corporate Independent Political Expenditures, 13 NEV. L.J.

134, 155-67 (2012); Jonathan Romiti, Note, Playing Politics with Shareholder Value: The Case for
Applying Fiduciary Law to Corporate Political Donations Post-Citizens United, 53 B.C. L. REV. 737,
769-73 (2012).
143.

James Kwak, Corporate Law Constraints on Political Spending, 18 N.C. BANKING INST.

251, 253 (2013).
144. See cummings, supra note 8, at 108.
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tortiously in a business relationship. 14 5 The Citizens United decision has
enabled CEOs to select and elect state judges who are amenable to the
business law policies favored by the CEOs.1 46
Most business law textbooks fail to question or even mention the
political role of the corporation, the recent expansion of that role, the fact
that the expansion enjoys a weak state law basis, and the implications in
terms of CEO power arising from the expanded political role of the public
firm. The Eisenberg text mentions the Citizens United case immediately
following materials concerning corporate power to make charitable
contributions, but it offers no explicit opportunity to critique or analyze
the expansion of corporate political power.14 7 The text also raises
corporate governance questions regarding corporate political activity but
does not attempt to spark discussion about whether such activity is
something that corporations should pursue. 14 8 The Choper, O'Kelley,
Epstein, and Klein texts all fail to mention or make reference to Citizens
United.14 9 Despite multiple entry points in the current corporate law canon,
textbooks generally ignore the political role of the corporation.5 o These
omissions make it difficult to have thoughtful classroom discussions on
the proper political status of the public corporation or the role of the CEO
in directing the prodigious spending of corporations for political purposes.

145. Id at 99-102. See also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals judge should have recused himself as matter of due process
because president and CEO of corporation appearing before him contributed some $3 million to his
election campaign following trial court's entry of $50 million judgment against corporation when it
was likely that corporation would be seeking review in Supreme Court of Appeals).
146. See cummings, supra note 8, at 102-09; see also Michael H. LeRoy, Do PartisanElections
ofJudges Produce Unequal Justice when Courts Review Employment Arbitrations?,95 IOWA L. REV.

1569 (2010).
147. EISENBERG & Cox, supranote 7, at 267.

148. Id The Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby provides another important illustration of
the judiciary's acquiescence to the arguably unreasonable expansion of corporate power and influence.
The Court held that the religious beliefs of the owners of small family-owned businesses could be
(2014) (holding
attributed to the corporation itself. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
that corporations could not be compelled by law to do anything they find religiously objectionable). A
group of corporate lawyers and professors signed onto an amicus brief explaining that this holding
eviscerated the fundamental notion in corporate law that a corporation is an entity or person that is
separate from its owners or shareholders. Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. _ (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL
333889.
149. See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1130; O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1164;
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xxi; KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at xxiv.

150. See Michael D. Guttentag, Teaching Citizens United v. FEC in the Introductory Business
Associations Course, 8 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 163, 165-66 (2013) (arguing that Citizens United can be
integrated into the typical Business Associations course when discussing shareholder primacy, agency
costs between managers and owners, and when discussing the risk management role of transactional
attorneys).
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This kind of discussion can occur only if supplemental material is
assigned. Thus, at a time when high-profile commentators demonstrate
that America has devolved into an aristocracy of CEOs, students will be
ill-equipped to assess whether the new political power of the CEO
contributes to this new reality.' 5 1
IV. CEO PRIMACY AND AMERICA'S NEW ECONOMIC ROYALTY
Noticeably missing from all major business law texts is a discussion
connecting the reckless mismanagement of many corporate leaders with
the mortgage crisis of 2008. After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, many
experts and commentators concluded that CEOs and senior executives at
major financial firms received excessive compensation for pursuing
reckless lending and investment activities, which led to catastrophic losses
for the firms and huge paydays for senior executives.1 52 In fact, the head of
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), which supervises
all national banks and federally chartered thrifts, concluded that
underlying the entire debacle was "the worst mortgage underwriting in our
nation's history."153 These reckless mortgages added huge risks to an
already over-leveraged financial sector, meaning that small losses could

151. See Robert J. Samuelson, The CEO Aristocracy: Big Bucks for the Big Boss, WASH. POST,
June 22, 2014, archived at http://perma.cc/83DM-JBZV.
152. E.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the
FinancialCrisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 859-60 ("The financial crisis helps make the case that boards
should do more monitoring. Corporate behavior in the crisis yielded enormous negative extemalities for the
greater society. Corporations were able ... [to] incentivize risky behavior that yields negative externalities,
[so] it seems appropriate that boards do more to prevent the abuse of [limited liability]."); Lucian A.
Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure:Executive Compensation at Bear Steams and Lehman 20002008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257-60 (2010) (finding that "the top executive teams of Bear Stearns
and Lehman" derived billions in compensation, "exceed[ing] the value of the executives' [stock]
holdings at the beginning of the period," such that "the bottom-line payoffs of these executives during
2000-2008 were not negative but rather decidedly positive."); Kenneth R. Davis, Taking StockSalary and Options Too: The Looting of CorporateAmerica, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 419-20 (2010)
("Too many managers appointed to protect the interests of shareholders are looting their companies...
. Even in 2008, a year of shriveling corporate profits and plummeting stock prices, more CEOs saw
pay increases than cuts. Despite the ravages of the financial crisis, average CEO pay in 2008 declined
only modestly."); Morgenson, supra note 74 ("Executives at seven major financial institutions that
have collapsed, were sold at distressed prices or are in deep to the taxpayer received $464 million in
performance pay since 2005.... Yet these firms have reported losses of $107 billion since 2007 ....
And $740 billion in stock market value has been lost since these companies' shares peaked in 2007,
just before the housing bubble burst.").
153. John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Remarks Before the Exchequer Club 6 (July 21, 2010), available at http://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/speeches/2010/pub-speech-2010-84a.pdf ("[T]he recent financial crisis was caused by a
number of factors ... [including,] at the heart of it all, the worst mortgage underwriting in our nation's
history.").
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wipe out equity and lead to mass insolvency.1 54 All of this led to massive
losses for shareholders and the economy at large.155 CEOs essentially
manipulated risk to pump up short-term profits, saddling the entire
financial sector with a very high probability of systemic failure.5 6 The
FCIC confirmed that compensation rewarded high-risk short-term gains
and resulted in long-term threats to firms' financial viability.5 7 Little
mention of this lethal mismanagement is included in major business law
texts today, even though they may include extended discussions of
compensation issues.' 58 It is as if the crisis simply did not happen, or
corporate governance played no role-and these texts foreclose any debate

154. As the FCIC explains:
By one measure, [the five major investment banks'] leverage ratios were as high as 40 to 1,
meaning for every $40 in assets, there was only $1 in capital to cover losses. Less than a 3%
drop in asset values could wipe out a firm. To make matters worse, much of their borrowing
was short-term, in the overnight market-meaning the borrowing had to be renewed each and
every day.
FCIC REPORT, supra note 26, at xix.

155. Losses from the crisis include lost wealth of $9 trillion and foregone GDP could approach
$10 trillion. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supranote 26.

156. See supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text. See also Raghuram Rajan, Bankers' Pay is
Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at 11, available at http://us.fi.com/ftgateway/superpage.
ft?newsid=fto010920081142101282 ("[U]nless we fix incentives in the financial system we will get
more risk than we bargain for. Unless bankers offer these better explanations, their enormous pay,
which has been thought of as just reward for performance, will deservedly come under scrutiny.");
Paul Krugman, Banks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A37, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/23/opinion/23krugman.html?_r-0
("Executives
are lavishly
rewarded if the companies they run seem successful: last year the chief executives of Merrill and
Citigroup were paid $48 million and $25.6 million, respectively. But if the success turns out to have
been an illusion-well, they still get to keep the money.").
157. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 26, at xix ("Compensation systems ... too often rewarded the
quick deal, the short-term gain-without proper consideration of long-term consequences. Often, those
systems encouraged the big bet-where the payoff on the upside could be huge and the downside
limited. This was the case up and down the line-from the corporate boardroom to the mortgage
broker on the street."). Both the Chair of the FDIC and the Chair of the SEC concurred in this basic
conclusion. Id. at 64 (quoting SEC Chair Mary Schapiro: "Many major financial institutions created
asymmetric compensation packages that paid employees enormous sums for short-term success, even
if these same decisions result in significant long-term losses or failure for investors and taxpayers.").
158. Fed Chair Ben Bemanke explained just how lethal the risk manipulation was:
As a scholar of the Great Depression, I honestly believe that September and October of 2008
was the worst financial crisis in global history, including the Great Depression. . . . [O]ut of
maybe the . . . 13 of the most important financial institutions in the United States, 12 were at
risk of failure within a period of a week or two.
Id at 354. See also CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at xxv, 7-8, 647-49 (mentioning in short discussions
scattered throughout the text the financial crisis as well as raising the possibility of risk manipulation
to seek enhanced compensation and Congress' response to the problem in the form of the Dodd-Frank
Act); O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at xxv, 7-8, 248-49 (mentioning the financial crisis but
failing to mention links to risk manipulation and compensation arrangements encouraging excessive
risk).
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on this point.1 59 The problem of excessive executive compensation and
incentives to manipulate risk continues to plague public firms, yet the
subject is ignored in business law texts and classrooms.
To address the problem of excessive compensation, Congress included
a provision within the Dodd-Frank Act that gave shareholders a "say on
,,160
pay.
More precisely, the Act mandated that shareholders have an
advisory vote on executive pay.' 6 ' This precatory vote, however, has not
been an effective mechanism for controlling CEO pay. 162 In the past two
years since say on pay took effect, CEO pay has soared-in some cases
exceeding $1 billion in a single year.' 63 Executive compensation now
stands at a level that exceeds pre-crisis highs.16 The core problem is that
say on pay lacks teeth-a no vote is next to meaningless. And when
shareholders do approve high payouts it serves to encourage excessive

pay. 165
Progressive corporate law scholars have argued that the "say on pay"
rules should have been an occasion for state courts to reinvigorate state
fiduciary duty standards as a mechanism for imposing more effective
corporate governance.' 66 The prospects for this kind of change in any
meaningful sense are dim at best.' 67 Instead, this modest reform seems to
have backfired as managers use shareholder votes to justify larger pay

159. See, e.g., EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 730-56 (discussing compensation but not
financial crisis); CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 131-54 (same).
160. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-1900 (2010) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012)).
161. This was only the most recent federal effort to reign in corporate excesses. LOUIS Loss, JOEL
SELIGMAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 55-57 (6th ed. 2011) (historical

overview of federal efforts to reign-in corporate excesses under the federal securities laws.).
162. Jesse Eisinger, Ixnay on 'Say on Pay', PROPUBLICA (June 26, 2013, 12:00 PM), archived at
http://perma.cc/JXR2-9T2B.
163. See supra notes 4 and 11 and accompanying text. The high end of CEO pay soared to
unprecedented levels recently, as ten CEOs made over $100 million, and two made over $1 billion.
Dina ElBoghdady, Two CEOs Break a Billion-Dollar Record, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2013, archived at
http://perma.cc/4J94-29AF.
164. Eisinger, supra note 162.
165. See John Carney, Why 'Say on Pay' Failed and Why That's a Good Thing, CNBC (July 3,
2013, 6:00 AM), archivedat http://perma.cc/PNU6-3F3D.
166. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay's Impact on Directors'FiduciaryDuties,
55 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 25 (2013).

167. The most significant corporate law jurisdiction, Delaware, continues to insist that senior
managers of public firms hold immunity for misconduct short of intentional wrongdoing. It also seeks
more risk in public firms while being incapable of comprehending that too much risk can pose lethal
dangers to firms and the economy as a whole. See In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964
A.2d 106, 114 n. 6 (Del. Ch. 2009) ("[T]he threat of personal liability may discourage beneficial risk
taking.").
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packages.168 In sum, the say on pay effort to control perverse
compensation incentives is a bust.1 6 9
Another Dodd-Frank Act failure is the effort by Congress to reform
proxy access so that shareholders could access management's proxy
solicitation to nominate directors and run candidates against
management's own selections.1 7 0 The SEC attempted to implement the
power Congress expressly gave it to allow shareholders expanded proxy
access.17 1 In Business Roundtable v. SEC,1 7 2 the D.C. Circuit Court held
that the SEC's effort to implement this part of Dodd-Frank was not valid
because the SEC failed to perform an adequate cost-benefit analysis, and
its rule was therefore arbitrary and capricious. 73 Consequently, in the
public firm today, management still selects management, meaning that
shareholder supervision is not possible and compensation soars ever
higher.1 7 4
Despite broad consensus that perverse compensation incentives drove
the financial crisis and the resulting Dodd-Frank legislation, corporate law
textbooks largely ignore the links between compensation and the crisis. 7 5
For example, the Klein text declines a perfect platform to take up the issue
of skewed corporate executive compensation when it examines Disney.'76
In that case, Disney shareholders sued the Disney board of directors for
entering into an astonishing contract with former Disney President
Michael Ovitz that turned out to pay Ovitz more money when he was
terminated from the company without fault than it would have paid out

168. See Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J.

CORP. L. 417, 461 (2011) ("Shareholder approval has the potential to insulate directors from criticism
for compensation decisions, which may perversely lead directors at some firms to offer pay packages
that are higher and less sensitive to performance than the current baseline.").
169. See Eisinger, supranote 162.
170. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 971 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n) (2012)
(authorizing the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule).
171. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,753-76 (Sept. 16,
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240.14a- 11).
172. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
173. Id at 1148 ("We agree with the petitioners and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously for having failed once again . . . adequately to assess the economic effects of a new
rule.").

174. See supra notes 17-19. See also 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2013) (allowing management to
exclude shareholder proposals from management's proxy solicitation materials if the shareholder
proposal relates to a director election). Thomas Piketty argues the ability of CEOs to set their own
compensation (or have other CEOs set CEO pay) has caused an explosion in manager salaries leading
to soaring inequality. PIKETrY, supra note 5, at 331-32.
175. See supranotes 9, 10, 152, 156 and 157.
176. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd sub nom.,
Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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had he performed the life of his contract.1 77 Ovitz took home close to $130
million for his fourteen months of service to Disney-roundly considered
a failed tenure.'7 8 Noted commentators concluded that, in the end, the
Disney litigation resulted in yet another judicial power transfer to CEOs to
enter into dubious compensation arrangements with other officers.1 79
When presented with the opportunity to critically examine executive
compensation and the perverse incentives that motivate executives to take
excessive and reckless risks based on astonishing pay packages, the Klein
text eschews the opportunity. 8 0 Rather, the text reads as if astonishing
executive compensation is natural, even appropriate, and board members
are rightly protected from shareholder inquiry if an excessive pay package
is approved by a compensation committee and compensation expert.' 8
The message is that corporate executives deserve the hundreds of millions
of dollars of compensation, even if their tenure is deemed a failure.
While Klein fails to critically examine enormous executivecompensation payouts and the attendant consequences, it does take note of
the Dodd-Frank Act's "say on pay" provisions to alert students to the fact
that shareholders now have the right to take a periodic "non-binding"
advisory vote on executive pay.1 82 In noting that Dodd-Frank tries to
address not only "Wall Street Banks" but also corporate compensation
generally in the United States, Klein matter-of-factly reports that "[t]he
results of the [say on pay] vote are not binding on the board of directors.
Indeed, the Act makes clear that the vote shall not be deemed either to
effect or affect the fiduciary duties of directors."' 83
As the Klein text is perhaps the most widely adopted Business
Associations textbook in the United States, thousands of law students
annually are given no critical analysis of executive compensation as
currently practiced in corporate America, nor are they encouraged to think

177. Disney, 907 A.2d at 704.
178. Brehm, 906 A.2d at 35.
179. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg & Matthew D. Bivona, Disney Goes Goofy: Agency, Delegation,
and CorporateGovernance, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 230 (2008) ("The Disney case recognized Eisner's
unilateral actual authority to terminate without cause the company's president, causing the issuance of
a $130 million severance payment. This event took place with no board of director discussion or
approval."). The judicial grant of arguably unreasonable levels of power to CEOs is embodied in the
court's holding that the board of Disney acted in good faith and with no duty of care breach when they
hired and fired Michael Ovitz.
180.

KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 374-90.

181. Id.at389.
182. Id. at 390 (discussing Dodd-Frank pay reforms without any context regarding the financial
crisis). This appears to be the only discussion of the financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act in Klein.
Id. at 909.
183. Id. at 390.
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about the possibility that executive compensation paradigms may have
helped to precipitate the financial crisis. 184 One of the most controversial
issues in corporate law today, excessive executive compensation and its
manifest costs, is nearly invisible in one of the most widely adopted
business law texts on the market.' 8 ' Not only is the subject left
unaddressed, but if a business law professor that uses the Klein text
intends to examine executive compensation and the perverse incentives
that motivate so many business leaders today, that professor is forced to
supplement the text and bring in a significant amount of outside reading.
This can alienate students, already burdened with significant amounts of
work, and cause discordance for a professor who assigns materials some
students may deem inappropriate because it is "not in the book."
No other mainstream business law textbook adequately considers the
issue of excessive executive compensation insofar as the financial crisis
and CEO power is concerned. There is a mention of excessive executive
compensation in the Epstein text, but no serious critical consideration of it
or link to the financial crisis. 18 6 No substantial discussion at all of links
between excessive risk-taking incentives in executive compensation and
the financial crisis appears in the Choper text,' 87 the Eisenberg text'88 or

Heminway, Teaching Business Associations Law in the Evolving New Market Economy, 8 J. BUS.

&

184. Inclusion of this topic in the text (or any topic discussed herein) obviously does not mean that
the authors of the text endorse any particular position or that these professors teach any particular
position. Instead, it only means that students may engage in thoughtful discussion on the topic if a
given professor deems the topic worth the time given what else must be covered. See Joan MacLeod
TECH. L. 175, 190 (2013) (articulating four primary goals for the basic business organizations course:
"(1) efficiently use available resources, (2) build from individual strengths, (3) meet institutional
curricular and degree requirements, and (4) educate our students for the short-term and long-term
demands of a business law or other practice in a rapidly changing legal employment and education
setting"). With respect to the issue of the excessive compensation and the financial crisis, lawmakers,
influential commentators and a consensus of economists concluded that excessive compensation was
"partly responsible for the financial crisis." John Cassidy, Wall Street Pay: Where's the Reform?, NEW
YORKER, July 23, 2010, archivedat http://perma.cc/N2JN-F9R4. Thus, future business leaders should
at least hold the possibility of an unencumbered discussion of the issue.
185. See supra note 182.
186. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 261-70, 311-12, 315-18 (discussing the financial crisis but
failing to link executive compensation to excessive risk and risk manipulation). See also id. at 658
(discussing how the business judgment rule operates to protect subprime mortgage investments in
Delaware).
187. The Choper text includes a credible discussion on the power of CEOs and executive
compensation. CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 5-17, 131-35, 142-44, 533-38. Choper also footnotes
a reference to potential director liability for investment in subprime mortgages, but with no discussion
of the role of such lax oversight in the financial crisis of 2008. Id. at 98 n.44, 139 n.101. As previously
demonstrated, while the Choper text does in fact mention excessive risk taking and perverse
compensation incentives during the financial crisis, no student would have any clue that numerous
experts and legal inquiries target these factors as a key driver of the crisis. Id. at xxv, 7-8, 647-49
(mentioning in short discussions scattered throughout the text the financial crisis as well as raising the
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the O'Kelley text. 189 Leading corporate law professors who draft the most
adopted business law textbooks in the country provide no assessment of
the verdict of the FCIC, Nobel laureates, or a wide array of other
economists that corporate law allows CEOs to pillage their firms to attain
massive compensation payments.
Excessive CEO compensation has now figured prominently in a series
of corporate fiascos this century. First, in 2001-2002, a battery of public
firms collapsed amid accounting frauds rooted in efforts by senior
managers to increase their options-based compensation.' 90 Second, in
2006, options back-dating emerged as another way for CEOs to take for
themselves millions of dollars from shareholders.191 Third, during the
subprime debacle, senior executives received huge incentive-based
compensation payments for manipulating risk, even though these risks
ultimately sank the entire financial sector and led to the Great Financial
Crisis of 2007-2009.192 The costs of this misconduct are measured in the
trillions.' 93
Yet, perhaps the greatest cost of CEO dominance is not the occasional
massive macroeconomic disruption implicit in financial crises. Instead,
CEO primacy inflicts a daily toll on the economy in the form of
compromised financial performance.1 94 CEOs simply hold too much

possibility of risk manipulation to seek enhanced compensation and Congress' response to the problem
in the form of the Dodd-Frank Act).
188. See EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 1465, 1475.
189. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supranote 7, at 325-326, 379-395. The O'Kelley text includes
a limited discussion of the financial crisis of 2008, but no mention of perverse compensation
incentives or risk manipulation for higher compensation. Id. at 7-8.
190. See generally andr6 douglas pond cummings, "Ain't No Glory in Pain": How the 1994
Republican Revolution and the PrivateSecurities Litigation Reform Act Contributedto the Collapse of

the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L. REv. 979 (2005) (describing the accounting frauds at
Enron, WorldCom, and many others resulting from corporate executives attempting to maintain high
stock value to enhance executive compensation payouts).
191.

See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact ofBackdating of Executive Stock Options,

105 MICH. L. REv. 1597, 1641 (2007) ("[O]ur evidence suggests that managerial theft is not a zerosum game, but involves huge dead-weight losses for the shareholders.").
192. See Philip Coggan, The Bonus Racket, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2009, at 79 ("In effect,
executives and employees were given a call option on the markets by the banking system. They took
most of the profits when the market was booming and shareholders bore the bulk of the losses during
the bust."). In the three years prior to the crisis, Bear Steams paid $11.3 billion in compensation and
benefits while the shareholders were wiped out in bankruptcy; Lehman Brothers paid $21.6 billion and
went bankrupt; finally, Merrill Lynch paid compensation and benefits of $45 billion while its
shareholders got $9.6 billion in Bank of America stock. Id.
193. See supranote 26.
194. See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance andEquity Prices, 118 Q. J. EcoN. 107, 145
(2003) (finding that potential gains from improvements in corporate governance "would be
enormous").
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power.' 95 For example, the simple expedient of splitting the CEO position
from the Chair of the Board results in dramatic performance gains at the
worst performing companies.' 96 And there are other fundamental corporate
governance matters that should be addressed and assessed in Business
Associations casebooks. An independent risk-management committee is
associated with superior financial performance, particularly in financial
firms.

97

Diverse boardrooms have also been linked to valuation gains.' 98

Shareholders value the ability to exercise votes in a meaningful way in the
context of shareholder access to management's proxy for director
elections.' 9 9

The political power of CEOs is the linchpin of CEO primacy.
Economists have modeled how CEOs are able to wield political power to
entrench and enrich themselves at shareholder expense. These models are
consistent with extant empirical evidence.2 00 This observation draws
further support from the devolution of law and regulation in favor of
managers that coincides with their runaway compensation, as discussed
above. For example, in Delaware and most other jurisdictions, the law
now provides for the elimination of liability for breach of the directors'
duty of care. 20 1 This makes it less likely that boards will supervise CEOs.

195.

Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons From the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54

ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 52 (2009).
196. Vo, supra note 8, at 126-29. See also Ryan Krause & Matthew Semadeni, Apprentice,
Departure, and Demotion: An Examination of the Three Types of CEO-Board Chair Separation, 56

ACAD. MGMT. J. 805, 805 (2013) ("In a study of Standard & Poor's (S&P) 1500 and Fortune 1000
firms, we find that separation of the two leadership roles positively impacts future firm performance
when current performance is poor, but negatively impacts future firm performance when current
performance is high. We find that this effect is most dramatic for demotion separations.").
197. E.g., Ryan J. Baxter et al., Enterprise Risk Management Program Quality: Determinants,
Value Relevance, and the Financial Crisis, 30 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1264 (2013) (finding that

superior Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is associated with superior accounting performance and
firm value); Robert E. Hoyt & Andre P. Liebenberg, The Value ofEnterpriseRisk Management, 78 J.
RISK & INS. 795 (2011) (finding that insurance firms practicing ERM enjoy a 20 percent valuation
premium.).

198. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. See also Torchia et al., supra note 96 (finding
that firms with a critical mass of women on the board are more innovative).
199. See Becker et al., supranote 21 (finding that sophisticated shareholders value proxy access).
200. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics,
23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1089 (2010) (articulating a model of sub-optimal corporate governance based
upon lobbying resources and incentives and concluding that a CEO primacy model is consistent with
extant empirical evidence).

201. Delaware essentially abolished liability under the duty of care for directors of public firms in
1987, through the passage of Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 102(b)(7). DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). The synopsis of the bill indicated that the legislature was
animated by the concerns of the insurance industry. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The
Relevance of the Duty of Care Standardin CorporateGovernance, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1, 43 (1989). This

is odd given that the market value of such insurance companies rose significantly after the Smith v.
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Corporate leadership has also escaped liability for securities fraud because
plaintiffs are now required to plead a "strong inference" of scienter
202
without the benefit of discovery. And big business leaders consistently
exercise political power in a way that deprives shareholders of any real
voice in the selection of board directors.2 03
The political power of CEOs reached its zenith in the aftermath of the
financial market crisis of 2007-09. Despite proof of massive fraud, no
individual corporate leader faced any real criminal accountability for the
misconduct underlying the crisis.204 In particular, no senior executive of
any Wall Street bank faced indictment for the wrongdoing that precipitated
the crisis. 2 0 5 The Department of Justice has failed to accurately justify this
apparent immunity.206 A lack of accountability for the most powerful does
violence to the rule of law and encourages lawlessness throughout our
society. 20 7 While there may be some colorable basis for declining to

pursue criminal charges against banks backed by the full faith and credit of

Van Gorkom decision. Id. at 74. It appears insurance companies were able to use the decision to
enhance their premium revenues with little real additional risk. Id.
202.

Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in PrivateSecurities Litigation: Dealingwith the

.

Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1076, 1084 (1999) ("The .

.'reforms' of private securities litigation are a betrayal of.. . the federal securities laws and expose our

financial system to risks that are not fully appreciated. A more reactionary cycle could hardly have
been imagined by the promulgators of the federal securities laws in the early 1930s."). Most major
texts at least mention the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in passing while failing to link the
Act to the massive securities fraud underlying the subprime debacle. See, e.g., EISENBERG & COX,
supra note 7, at 863-66; O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1030-59; CHOPER ET AL, supra

note 7, at 407-13.
203. The Business Roundtable and the United States Chamber of Commerce-lobbying
organizations that operate to further the interests of CEOs-recently stymied the SEC's efforts to give
shareholders access to management's proxy for the purpose of participating in the director-selection
process insofar as proxy voting is concerned. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146-47
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
204.

See Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and

Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669 (2014) (reviewing evidence of massive
securities fraud).
205. Id. at 723 n.362 ("In early 2013, Frontline investigated 'why Wall Street's leaders have
escaped prosecution for any fraud related to the sale of bad mortgages.' . . .Among its findings was an
apparent lack of criminal Grand Jury investigations . . . .") (citing Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS
television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/MQ4-6GT6).
206. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T. OF JUST., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S EFFORTS TO
ADDRESS MORTGAGE FRAUD, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT Div., AUDIT REPORT 14-

12, at 29 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/al4l2.pdf.) ("The
Inspector General of the Department of Justice also found that the Department mislead [sic] the public
with regard to its prosecutorial efforts against financial and mortgage fraud. . . . Thus, the criminal
response to the frauds underlying the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 has been weaker than
reported.").
207. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, CriminalAffirmance: Going Beyond the Deterrence Paradigmto
Examine the Social Meaning of Declining Prosecution of Elite Crime, 45 CONN. L. REV. 865, 871

(2013).
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the U.S. government,20 8 there is no basis for individual immunity for top
financial executives. Moreover, this immunity from prosecution and the
recklessness that presaged the market crisis are not mentioned in any of
the leading corporations' textbooks to date.209
The irrational deviations from traditional norms described in the
preceding paragraphs speak volumes about the power of CEOs. 21 0 But,
little to nothing is mentioned in leading business law texts that would
challenge the new primacy of the CEO.
V. CORPORATIZATION OF PRISONS AND SCHOOLS

Also absent in any Business Associations textbook is discussion of the
disquieting trend whereby traditional governmental functions are turned
over to profit-seeking firms. 2 1 1 For example, one increasingly popular

208. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Special Problem of Banks and Crime, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1
(2014) (arguing that externalities to prosecutions justify declination of prosecutions of banks).
209. While the issues of CEO power and accountability squarely implicate basic corporate
governance principles, criminal exposure for acts surrounding the financial crisis is arguably less
central to corporate law. Nevertheless, as an indicator of the political power of CEOs, and the impact
of that political power on the fabric of basic corporate law, criminal immunity for top executives must
warrant discussion to some extent. The most likely placement for this discussion is either in sections
discussing executive compensation or the effort to reduce agency costs within the corporation through
fiduciary duties. See, e.g., EISENBERG & Cox, supranote 7, at 299-314; CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7,
at 32-35. Unfortunately, reading these sections of the texts, one would not even know the crisis of
2007-2009 ever occurred. See also O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1169-75; KLEIN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 895-928; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 635-39. The Epstein text was published in
2010, before it became clear that zero criminal prosecutions against personnel at the largest firms
would occur.
210. CEO power thus explains soaring compensation. Prominent economists cannot find any
performance-related basis for CEO pay. PIKETTY, supra note 5, at 334 ("The most convincing proof of
the failure of corporate governance . .. is that when we collect data about individual firms . . . it very
difficult to explain the observed variations [in pay] in terms of firm performance."). See also Piketty et
al., supra note 44, at 232 (finding that soaring CEO pay resulted from CEO power to set pay
independently from performance and incentives to exploit lower marginal tax rates).
211. Scholars increasingly contest the move of traditionally government functions to the corporate
space. They argue that corporations do not operate with respect for individual rights but do operate
without the checks and balances applicable to government actions. E.g., powell & Menendian, supra
note 8, at 121-24. They are not subject to anti-discrimination laws to the same extent as government
actors due to the State Action doctrine. See id at 121-22. Corporations represent highly concentrated
power, not diffused power like that associated with democracy. As Professors powell and Menendian
state:
[C]orporations make good servants, but bad masters. To paraphrase Rawls, we can have
either a corporatist welfare state or democracy, property respecting state. The rapid expansion
of corporate prerogative and growth of corporate space is not only a threat to individual
liberty and democratic accountability, it is a threat to the broadest public good. The
concentration of wealth and influence in corporate form is an increasingly evident structural
distortion in our economy and our politics.
Id. at 123.
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privatization trend involves the transfer of the operation or ownership of
correctional facilities from local, state, or federal governments to for-profit
corporations.2 12 Another significant privatization effort involves for-profit
companies that operate or manage primary and secondary public
schools.213 These companies control the lives and futures of vulnerable
constituencies-prisoners and students. These vulnerable individuals serve
as a source of shareholder wealth.
At its legal optimum, the public firm aggregates capital from passive
investors to fund ideas, innovation and entrepreneurial activities.2 14 It fuels
growth by lowering the cost of capital and eliminating the need for
expensive capital intermediation. 215 There are, however, limits to the
activities society should wish to capitalize through the economic benefits
of the public firm.216 Some activities do not warrant a lower cost of capital,
nor high-powered lobbying and electioneering efforts, as there exists a
zone of activities that may be best left to public funding.21 7
A. The PrisonIndustrialComplex
The prison industrial complex in the U.S. illustrates this limit. 2 1 8 The
inherent problems of privatizing traditionally public functions are

212. The privatization of prisons is not a new phenomenon. In 1995, seven percent of the
operators of state and federal facilities were private contractors. JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995, at 2 (1997). Typically,

one company "is responsible for everything that goes on in the prison, from the food that's served and
the vocational courses that are taught to the discipline that's meted out to inmates." Penelope Lemov,
Jailhouse Inc., GOVERNING MAGAZINE, May 1993, at 44. Lemov described one of the prison
companies, Corrections Corporation of America, and the fact that it sold its stock on a major stock
exchange. See id.
213. For-profit companies have also been retained to distribute social services program benefits.
See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION POSES
CHALLENGES IN ENDURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS (1997) (examining the policy

implications of privatization of social services for children).
214.

See RAMIREZ, supranote 2, at 51.

215. Id. at 49-51.
216. In decades past, corporate law textbooks addressed the limitations and restrictions imposed
upon corporate activities by states. E.g., WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND

MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 5-12 (5th ed. unabridged 1980). As Justice Brandeis recognized, these
restrictions were based upon "apprehension of corporate domination." Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee,
288 U.S. 517, 549, 555 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that traditionally corporations only
existed for a limited number of purposes and their powers were "sparingly conferred and strictly
construed").
217. This is particularly so in the wake of Citizens United. See supra Part III. We explain the
reasons why certain government functions are best left to the public sector in the subsections that
follow.
218. See Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison PrivatizationFueling the Prison Industrial

Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 589, 589 (2012) ("The Prison Industrial Complex ...

is a profiteering
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particularly evident in the context of carceral policy. 2 19 Should passive
investors profit from incarcerating fellow citizens? Should society
capitalize incarceration through the capital aggregation power of the
public firm? Is the use of the public firm to operate prisons acceptable,
particularly in light of the enhanced political power of the firm to
influence legislation and incarceration policies?
Consider the following facts. The U.S. currently incarcerates more
citizens than any nation on earth,220 outpacing such autocratic regimes as
China, Russia and Rwanda. 22 1 African Americans suffer disproportionately
from this excessive incarceration rate, accounting for more than forty
percent of the nation's inmates but only thirteen percent of the
population.222 This stunning percentage is exacerbated when you consider
that most incarcerated African Americans are males. Nearly one in three
African-American males can now expect to face some time in prison.22 3
Latino males similarly make up large percentages of the U.S. prison
population even though they make up a much smaller percentage of our
nation's citizenry.224 Additionally, the federal government holds
approximately 34,000 immigration law violators in detention facilities that

system fueled by the economic interests of private corporations, federal and state correctional
institutions, and politicians."). See also Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, THE
ATLANTIC, Dec. 1998, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prisonindustrial-complex/304669/ ("The prison-industrial complex is not only a set of interest groups and
institutions. It is also a state of mind. The lure of big money is corrupting the nation's criminal-justice
system, replacing notions of public service with a drive for higher profits.").
219. andr6 douglas pond cummings, "All Eyez On Me": America's War on Drugs and the PrisonIndustrial Complex, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 417, 419 (2012) ("The 'tough on crime' political
posturing and War on Drugs rhetoric have further led to an eruption in prison profiteering, in what has
come to be known, per Angela Davis, Comel West, and Talib Kweli, as the 'prison-industrial
complex."').
220. Michael B. Kelley & Christina Sterbenz, This World Map Shows the Enormity ofAmerica's
Prison Problem, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:58 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/world-

map-of-incarceration-rates-2014-l#ixzz2vyEV26eA.
221. Fulcher, supra note 218, at 591.
222. Michael B. Kelley, 13 Signs That America's Prison System Is out of Control, BUS. INSIDER

(Apr. 12, 2012, 1:40 PM), archivedathttp://perma.cc/9YAK-JUD8.
223. Saki Knafo, I in 3 Black Males Will Go to Prison in Their Lifetime, Report Warns, HUFF.
POST (Oct. 4, 2013, 3:24 PM), archivedat http://perma.cc/TN6-H56J.
224. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rdICCPR%
20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow/o20Report.pdf ("If current trends continue, one of every three
black American males born today can expect to go to prison in his lifetime, as can one of every six
Latino males--compared to one of every seventeen white males.").
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are often privately operated. 2 25 Essentially, mass incarceration operates to
create a new caste system of deeply disempowered minorities in the
u.s.

22 6

Public corporations profit from America's incarceration folly, 22 7 and it
is natural for these firms to lobby lawmakers and make campaign
contributions to further their economic interests. 2 2 8 Large private for-profit
prison corporations spend dozens of millions of dollars annually to lobby
for draconian sentencing penalties for crimes. 22 9 They also lobby
lawmakers to hunt for "new" crimes that will result in incarceration.230 For
private prison profiteers, the name of the game is head count. 2 3 ' Their goal
is to increase the number of heads that hit mattresses each night in their
private carceral facilities. 23 2 In this way, it appears that private prison

225.

William Selway & Margaret Newkirk, Congress Mandates Jail Beds for 34,000 Immigrants

as Private Prisons Profit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 23, 2013, 11:01 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/

C3NM-TJJK.
226.

MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 4 (2010) ("Quite belatedly, I came to see that

mass incarceration in the United States had, in fact, emerged as a stunningly comprehensive and welldisguised system of racialized social control that functions in a manner strikingly similar to Jim
Crow.").
227. See Joe Weisenthal, This Investor Presentationfor a Private Prison Is One of the Creepiest
Presentations We've Ever Seen, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2012, 1:06 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/

E8PS-CDEP.
228. PAUL ASHTON & AMANDA PETTERUTI, JUSTICE POLICY INST., GAMING THE SYSTEM: How
THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION

POLICIES 22 (2011), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/
gamingthe system.pdf (explaining that private prison companies like CCA, GEO Group, and Cornell
Corrections have hired thirty lobbyists, in Florida alone, to promote their prison interests). Further,
CCA has given over $900,000 annually to federal candidates since 2003, and the prison companies
have given more than $16 million to state and federal legislators since 2000-evidence that states are
some of the private prison companies' most important clients. Id. at 22, 24. See also Lee Hall, Nomads
Under the Tent ofBlue: MigrantsFuel the U.S. PrisonIndustry, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 265, 308

(2004) (explaining how private prison lobbyists exercise influence); Clifford J. Levy, Prison Company
FacesFine on Gaps in Lobbying Records, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at B5.
229. Cassandre Monique Davilmar, Note, We Tried to Make Them Offer Rehab, but They Said,
"No, No, No!": Incentivizing Private Prison Reform Through the Private Prisoner Rehabilitation

Credit, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 n.79 (2014) ("Private prison companies have aggressively
promoted public policies that tend to increase revenues for private prisons.").
230.

See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS

INCARCERATION 38 (2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage
20111102.pdf; Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=130833741 (describing how CCA hired
lobbyists to influence the Arizona legislature to pass a new law to increase prison populations).
231. See Davilmar, supra note 229, at 282 (noting that short term cost reductions lead to higher
recidivism and a greater prison population for private exploitation); ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note
228, at 9-12 (describing how private prison corporations promote policies that lead to greater numbers
of prisoners incarcerated which leads to larger profits for the corporation and its shareholders).
232. Davilmar, supra note 229, at 282 ("For society to benefit from private prisons, it must
demand more than a short-term, convenient solution to the prison problem. Otherwise, if prison
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corporations are perversely incentivized to increase human suffering in the
name of profit maximization and greed.233
Disturbingly, the private prison corporation manufactures nothing,
provides no genuinely valuable service, and simply acts as a conduit to
transfer taxpayer funds from government coffers into the hands of
shareholders and corporate executives.234 Private prison companies exist
primarily through government contracts that call upon them to warehouse
city, state, and federal prisoners. 23 5 They siphon off taxpayer funds without
manufacturing or providing anything truly useful. 23 6 Private prison
executives sell their services to governments and municipalities by
promising more efficiently run prisons and lower costs, but recent studies
indicate that private prisons are run less efficiently, less safely, and less
cost-effectively than are government-run prisons.2 37 Moreover, private

corporations are allowed to focus solely on short-term cost-reduction, their long-term revenue stream
will continue to increase to the detriment of society.").
233. See andr6 douglas pond cummings, Private Prison Profiteering, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(Feb. 22, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/J7WX-MMN3 (describing the lobbying efforts of private
prison for-profit business leaders to increase prison populations in order to increase shareholder
profits).
234. As Senator Robert F. Kennedy emphasized, in a 1968 speech at the University of Kansas, not
all economic activity enhances social welfare:
Gross National Product counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear
our highways of camage. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for the people who
break them. It counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in
chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and counts nuclear warheads and armored cars for the police
to fight the riots in our cities. It counts Whitman's rifle and Speck's knife, and the television
programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet the gross national
product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy
of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the
intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither
our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our
devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes life
worthwhile. And it can tell us everything about America except why we are proud that we are
Americans.
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, Speech at the University of Kansas (Mar. 18, 1968),
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/RFK-Speeches/Remarks-of-RobertF-Kennedy-at-the-University-of-Kansas-March-18-1968.aspx. Though prisons add to gross domestic
product, they may substract from the general welfare of the nation.
235. RAMIREZ, supra note 2, at 21 ("Excessive prison expenditures may enhance short-term
growth, but only at the cost of any reasonable measure of aggregate social happiness-a society that
imprisons many of its citizens suffers from either an abnormally high concentration of dangerously
violent people (unlikely) or an out-of-whack criminal justice system.").
236. See Robert J. Gordon, Two Centuries of Economic Growth: Europe Chasing the American

Frontier 13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10662, 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0662 (arguing that excessive prison expenditures in U.S. masks (in
part) inferior U.S. productivity relative to Europe).
237. CORRECTIONAL INST. INSPECTION COMM. REP. ON THE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION OF
THE LAKE ERIE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Jan. 22-23, 2013, available at http://big.assets.
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prisons have failed to lower recidivism rates. 2 38 So, at its core, the private
prison company simply exists as a transfer mechanism of taxpayer funds
from average U.S. taxpayers to private prison shareholders and company
executives.
More nefariously, private prison corporations also profit from prison
labor, essentially engaging in a program of modem day indentured
servitude.2 39 Increasingly, private prison executives enter into contracts
with a variety of companies that use prison labor at deep discounts to
manufacture or develop their products. With companies able to pay
prisoners significantly less than minimum wage, private prisons profit on
the backs of those confined in their facilities, while the companies that
contract for prison labor are able to place a "made in America" tag on their
products and pay significantly less than minimum wage.24 0 In both
Georgia and Wisconsin, prisoners are paid nothing for their labor. 24 ' They
are modem day slaves, exploited by the private prison regime.
Corporations that have profited from prison labor since the inception of
the private prison corporation include big-name companies like Starbucks,
McDonalds, IBM, Victoria's Secret and many others.242
The for-profit private prison corporation profits by increasing the
number of American citizens that are incarcerated while simultaneously
exploiting their labor-perverse behavior that the law currently
incentivizes.243 To increase profits, corporate leadership of private prison
companies must hope for, even work for, an increase in the number of men
and women put behind bars in the United States. This work is handsomely
rewarded as 2011 reports indicate that the two largest private prison

huffmgtonpost.com/lakeeriereport.pdf; John Burnett, Miss. Prison Operator out; Facility Called a
'Cesspool', NPR (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/24/151276620/firm-leaves-miss-afterits-prison-is-called-cesspool; David M. Reutter, FloridaProvidesLesson in How Not to PrivatizeState
Prisons, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/feb/15/
florida-provides-lesson-in-how-not-to-privatize-state-prisons/.
238. Davilmar, supra note 229, at 276-77.
239. Patrice Fulcher, Emancipate the FLSA: Transform the Harsh Economic Reality of Working
Inmates, _ ST. JOHN'S J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. _ (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 4) (on file with
authors).
240. Id at 14-15
241. See id at 20 n. 110 (citing Rhonda Cook, Inmates Use Technology to Organize State Prison
Protest, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Dec. 13, 2010, 3:48 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/

news/local/inmates-use-technology-to-organize-state-prison-pr/nQnsN/).
242. See id. at 32-33.
243.

See Vicky Pelaez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New Form of

Slavery?, GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-theunited-states-big-business-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289.
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companies, Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA") and the GEO
Group together earned more than $2.9 billion in profits in 2010.24
It is important to understand how private prison corporations work for
an increase in the number of persons incarcerated in the United States. The
CEO, with no supervision and with boards that fail to hold him
accountable, lobbies state and federal legislatures to increase prison
construction and increase the flow of clients-prisoners-into the prison
system. To accomplish this, the CEO has unfettered use of corporate funds
at his disposal to hire lobbyists and political consultants for electioneering
and politicking.245
The role of the corporation is to facilitate the flow of capital to
innovative and entrepreneurial activities, not to create rent seeking from
the destruction of human capital.246 If casebooks included some discussion
of privatization in general, and the new business of for-profit incarceration
in particular, students would have the opportunity to think about the role
of the corporation and the kinds of services that are best committed to
public supervision.
B. The PrivatizationofPublic Schools
For-profit companies that manage and operate primary and secondary
public schools provide another example of the social impact of the
corporate sector that all Business Associations casebooks overlook. In the
early 1990s, educators looked to business leaders to help resolve the
problem of failing public schools. 247 Business leaders proposed a market-

244. ASHTON & PETTERUTI, supra note 228, at 2.
245. See cummings, supra note 219, at 434-42.

246. One natural point for such discussion could be the ultra vires doctrine. Casebooks recognize
that this doctrine has its roots in the traditionally narrow scope of permissible activities granted to
corporations. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 7, at 249. But they typically fail to try to articulate any
modem theory defining the proper role for the public corporation, or to discuss the possibility that
corporations are not ideal for the wholesale displacement of government. Another point where such a
discussion could occur is with respect to the power of the corporation to make charitable contributions,
which at one time was considered ultra vires. Id at 261-67. Instead, texts seem to assume there is no
longer any theoretical limit to corporatization despite traditional skepticism and apprehension of
corporatization. See supranote 216. See also CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 19-29, 39-41, 65-69.
247. GARY MIRON & CHARISSE GULOSINO, NAT'L EDUC. POLICY CTR., PROFILES OF FOR-PROFIT
AND NONPROFIT EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 1 (Kevin Weiner et al. eds., 14th ed.

2013), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMO-profiles-l1-12.

See also Vaughan

Byrnes, Getting a Feel for the Market: The Use ofPrivatized School Management in Philadelphia, 115
Am. J. EDUC. 437, 437 (2009) ("[T]he plights facing the U.S. public education system have drawn

much attention and have been widely documented. This attention has focused predominantly on the
growing dropout crisis in U.S. high schools . . . [and] the widening achievement gap within U.S. public

schools between minority and low-income students and their more advantaged counterparts. . . .").
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based approach to school reform, and this helped to inspire the emergence
of education management organizations ("EMOs"). 2 48 The authors of a
report published by the National Education Policy. Center define an EMO
"as a private organization or firm that manages public schools, including
district and charter public schools." 24 9 The authors define for-profit EMOs

as "businesses that seek to return a profit to the owners or the stockholders
who invest in them." 25 0 They note that "[h]istorically, only a small portion
of EMOs have been nonprofits." 2 5 1
One company, Education Alternatives, Inc., was highly visible in the
1990s during the early years of school privatization. Education
Alternatives began its foray into the education business by contracting
with school boards in Dade County, Florida; Baltimore, Maryland; and
Hartford, Connecticut. 252 The company operated and managed several
public schools, but eventually, all of these contracts were cancelled. 25 3
Soon after the contracts were cancelled, in light of the difficulties
experienced by Education Alternatives, an article exploring the future of
for-profit investment in education suggested that school boards be more
careful when considering future privatization possibilities.2 54 The
journalists cautioned school officials to inquire about a for-profit
company's experience in education, the cost to prepare a contract, and the
costs of overseeing and appraising a company's performance.2 5
Eventually, Education Alternatives changed its name to The Tesseract
Group, Inc. As The Tesseract Group, the company owned and operated
several proprietary private schools and rendered management and
consulting services to public and private schools. But the company's
difficulties continued. In 2000, The Tesseract Group filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy.256
In spite of The Tesseract Group's failure, and the subsequent criticism
of school privatization, for-profit corporations continue in the business of
educating children. Some for-profit EMOs organize as corporations, others

248. MIRON & GULOSINO, supranote 247, at 1.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 2.
Id
Id. at 2-3.
See The Tesseract Group, Inc., Ann. Rep. (Form 10-K), 4-5 (Sept. 28, 1998).
Id.
See Deb Riechmann & John Gittelsohn, School Ventures on Hold?, ORANGE CNTY.

REGISTER, Feb. 2, 1996, at A12.

255. Id.
256. School Firm Filesfor Banruptcy [sic] Protection, PHOENIX BUS. J. (Oct. 9, 2000, 1:51 PM),
www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2000/10/09/daily7.html.
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as limited liability companies. 2 5 7 In 2012, for-profit EMOs operated in 35
U.S. states.258 "Each year since 2001-2002 the average enrollment for
[for-profit] EMO-managed schools has increased." 2 5 9 In the 2009-2010
academic year, 365,000 students attended schools managed by for-profit
EMOs. 260 In 2011-2012, 462,926 students attended schools managed by
for-profit EMOs, 2 6 1 representing a significant increase in the number of
students who depend on for-profit businesses for their education.2 62 The
size and number of for-profit EMOs have slowly but steadily increased.263
"In 2011-2012, the total number of schools operated by large for-profit
EMOs was 840, up from 808 in 2010-2011, an increase of 37 schools." 2 6
For-profit EMOs may manage or operate traditional district public
schools or charter schools. EMOs that manage district public schools do so
under a contract with local school districts.265 EMOs that manage charter
schools do so pursuant to a contract with the charter holder to manage the
school on the charter holder's behalf.26 6 "Charter holders may include
academic institutions, nonprofit foundations, and groups of parents,
teachers, or both." 2 67 There are states, however, like New York that do not
allow charter schools to hire for-profit EMOs to manage them.2 68
There is much disagreement about whether privatizing public schools
improves education. Those who support for-profit EMOs embrace the
spirit of entrepreneurship and market-based competition as a way to more
efficiently attain educational goals.2 69 Their position applies to for-profits
that manage charter schools as well as for-profits that manage district

257.

See MIRON & GULOSINO, supranote 247, at 23-29.

258. Id. at i.
259. Id. at 12.
260. Id. at iv.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 18 ("There are some interesting differences between schools operated by for-profit and
nonprofit EMOs. For-profit schools are more concentrated at the primary level than are nonprofit
schools. Across all categories, we find that for-profit schools have much larger enrollments per
school.").
263. Id at 5 ("Since the first Profiles report in 1999, the number of for-profit EMOs has increased
to 97 from 33. The number of states in which EMOs operate has grown to 35 from 16."). For-profit
EMOs may operate charter schools or traditional district schools, but the charter schools they manage
have tended to be significantly larger than charter schools that are not run by for-profits. John F. Witte,
Is It Privatization or Educational Choice that Matters? Comments on "Market- Versus Mission-

OrientedCharterSchools", 85 Soc. SCI. Q. 1052, 1053 (2004).
264. MIRON & GuLosINo, supranote 247, at 8.

265. Alex Molnar & David R. Garcia, The Expanding Role of Privatization in Education:
Q., Spring 2007, at 11, 13.
266. Id
267. Id.
268. See S. B. A.11310, 2010 Assemb., Reg Sess. (N.Y. 2010).

Implicationsfor TeacherEducation and Development, TEACHER EDUC.

269.

See MIRON & GULOSINO, supranote 247, at 1.
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schools. Proponents argue that public schools will have to improve
dramatically in order to compete with charter schools. 27 0 According to this
market-based analysis, public schools that do not improve will not survive
because they cannot compete with the superior-functioning charter
schools. 271 With respect to district schools managed by for-profits,
privatization proponents believe them to be far more efficiently and
effectively managed than district schools that are operated by government
or nonprofit entities.272 The enhanced efficiency and effectiveness,
according to privatization proponents, are attributable to an EMO's profit
motive. The companies will profit, shareholders or investors will benefit,
and future contracts will be available, only if the EMOs manage schools
efficiently. 273 Privatization advocates argue that schools managed by forprofit companies will educate students more efficiently because businesses
are not laden with the bureaucratic layers that impede innovation within
government and nonprofit organizations.274 Private companies, they argue,
are better run and more effectively use the resources they have.2 75 Many of
these same arguments are used to justify prison privatization.
Opponents of public education privatization also focus on the profit
motive. Opponents are concerned that "already limited school resources"
will be "redirected for service fees, profits, or both." 2 76 EMO managers
must economize, perhaps at student expense, in order to yield a profit for
shareholders at some point. Economizing to maximize profits, even if it
compromises student interests, is required under the prevailing

270. Id. at 2.
271. Id.
272. Id. ("A for-profit company contracted to manage district public schools, it is reasoned, will
have incentives (making a profit in the short term and retaining a profitable contract in the long term)
to seek efficiencies and improve student outcomes and achievement. The competition, in this context,
takes place not among schools or districts themselves, but among current or potential managers of
schools.").
273. Id. See also Molnar & Garcia, supra note 265, at 11 ("Advocates of market approaches to
education reform contend that creating a market in educational services will foster competition among
providers and thus spur delivery of better services at the same or lower cost than providing them
through traditional public schools.").
274. Bymes, supra note 247, at 438.
275. Id The position of privatization proponents "stem from the very fundamentals of traditional
capitalist economic doctrine, going back to the core of Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations." Id
Indeed, "[t]he basic ideas of removing government interference in the field of education and allowing
the natural free market forces such as competition to provide the public consumer with the best
possible education services are in a sense traditionally American, finding support from the preeminent
American economist of the twentieth century, Milton Friedman." Id.
276.

MtRON & GULosNo, supra note 247, at 1.
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interpretation of corporate law.277 If a company cuts corners to the
detriment of students in order to increase profits, parents will be
displeased and students may be harmed, but shareholders will be
delighted. When a for-profit EMO cuts corners to maximize profits, it is
doing what is expected under corporate law, even if the company is not
doing what is best for the students. In order to be profitable, EMOs may
"slash .. . per-pupil spending . . . [and] 'economize' by increasing class
sizes, cutting back drastically on special education and eliminating 'nonessential' teachers of art, music and other specialized subjects."278 Similar
questions arise when for-profit companies operate prisons. "Does a private
corporation skimp on food, cut corners on health care, reduce
rehabilitation activities, or pay its guards less in an effort to squeeze more
profit out of a prison contract?" 279 Emerging evidence suggests that private
prisons do in fact take these very measures in order to squeeze a profit
280
margin out of its prison contracts.
Opponents of public school privatization are also concerned about the
problems inherent in "creating another layer of administration." 28 1 They
disagree with privatization proponents who claim that for-profit businesses
reduce bureaucracy and operate more efficiently.2 82 Opponents of school
privatization are concerned that the business and governance of for-profit
education companies are not sufficiently transparent. 283 This concern

277. Cf Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). While Dodge is frequently
cited to support the notion of shareholder primacy, some commentators believe that the case does not
compel corporate managerial decision making that always requires the subordination of nonshareholder interests to those of shareholders, as long as the decision that benefits non-shareholders
has some connection to corporate profitability. See, e.g., William H. Simon, What Difference Does It
Make Whether CorporateManagers Have Public Responsibilities?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1697,

1698-99 (1993); Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, New Directions in Corporate Law:
Shareholders, Nonshareholdersand CorporateLaw: Communitarianismand Resource Allocation, 18

DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 398 (1993) ("It has been the dominant American conception of the corporation
for many years that a corporation's primary goal is, and should be, the maximization of shareholder
welfare."); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50

WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373, 1374 (1993) ("[S]hareholder primacy has served as corporate law's
governing norm for much of this century.").
278. Beth Wade, The Business ofEducating, AM. CITY & CNTY., Jan. 1995, at 24, 27 (quoting the
President of the National Education Association, Keith Geiger).
279. Lemov, supra note 212, at 45. See also Francis Wilkinson, Taking Prisons Private, AM.
LAW., Nov. 1988, at 101; Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public
Functions:Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1999) (citing Ira P. Robbins,
Debate Over Private Prisons Begs Ethical Questions, MANHATTAN LAW., Dec. 11, 1989, at 13)

(stating that prison privatization "raises major policy, legal and moral questions").
280. See supra note 237.
281.
282.
283.

MIRON & GULOSINO, supra note 247, at 1.
Id.
Id.
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seems justified by the low response rate of for-profit EMOs to requests for
basic structure and governance information from the National Education
Policy Center.2 84 The Center compiles information about the profiles of
both for-profit and nonprofit companies that manage or operate public
schools. Seventy-six percent of large for-profit EMOs did not respond to
the Center's request for information. 2 85 Seventy-six percent of medium
for-profit EMOs failed to respond, and ninety-three percent of small for286
profit EMOs ignored the Center's requests for information.
Both proponents and opponents of school privatization present
convincing arguments. And attempts to establish empirically the benefits
or disadvantages of school privatization are inconclusive. "Where
empirical studies have been done on different privatization models, the
research has been quite mixed, with positive results for privatization in
some cases and negative results in others."2 87 One recent empirical study
compared public schools to traditional private schools and found that
public schools are the best providers of educational services. 288 Where one
stands in the debate about privatization is not critically important. Critical,
however, is the fact that the debate about the role of the corporation in
public functions is not described in any of the leading Business
Associations casebooks.2 89
For-profit corporations that assume public functions, such as educating
children, or imprisoning individuals, are uniquely important. The
businesses in which they engage have profound effects not only on the
students and prisoners they purport to serve, but also on society in general.
The entire nation relies on the adequate provision of the services these
companies render.

284. Id. at 239.
285. Id.
286. Id. See also Molnar & Garcia, supranote 265, at 19 ("The governance structures of for-profit
companies are often obscured from public view. Therefore, much of what the public knows about the
governance of for-profit firms comes from anecdotal accounts.").
287. Byrnes, supra note 247, at 440.
288. CHRISTOPHER A. LUBIENSKI & SARAH THEULE LuBIENSKI, THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
ADVANTAGE: WHY PUBLIC SCHOOLS OUTPERFORM PRIVATE SCHOOLS 129-31 (2013) (finding that,

after accounting for socioeconomic status, race, and other demographic differences among students,
public school math achievement equaled or outstripped math achievement at every type of private
school in grades 4 and 8); DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION
MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1-10 (2013) ("[T]he transfer of public
funds to private management and the creation of thousands of deregulated, unsupervised, and

unaccountable schools have opened the public coffers to profiteering, fraud, and exploitation by large
and small entrepreneurs.").
289. See supra note 246. This is, of course, an outcome dictated by the paltry discussions about
any limits on corporatization or any discussion challenging the role of the corporation at all in
contemporary society.
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The business conducted by for-profit prisons and EMOs has great
ontological significance. These companies have assumed the most vital
government functions. The quality of a child's life, whether she fails or
succeeds, may depend on how well an EMO performs. There are
potentially dangerous consequences to the general public when a for-profit
company fails to consider adequately the interests of prisoners. For-profit
companies that manage prisons profoundly impact the lives of those they
incarcerate, and these companies determine their chances of success in the
future. The work that for-profit prisons and EMOs do "can be the starting
point, the fountainhead, of a life worth living." 2 90
For-profit prisons and EMOs "engage in businesses where human
beings are the source of shareholder profit. When private companies
manage prisons [and] public schools .

..

the inmates [and] students they

purport to serve become human commodities that are more like the
widgets manufactured by more typical corporations than they are like the
constituencies of traditional companies." 29 ' In this context, students and
inmates depend on for-profit companies for their critical existential needs.
The companies depend on the students and inmates for shareholder
profits.2 92
The history of the corporation includes a robust discussion of its proper
role under law.293 Traditionally, corporations were required to specify their
purposes and could not act ultra vires these purposes.29 4 The generalpurpose corporation is a relatively recent innovation dating only to the late
19th century.295 The enhanced political power of the corporation to
redefine "lawful" business and the encroachment of the public firm upon
traditionally public functions calls for a re-ignition of that debate.
Instead, none of this discussion appears in any of the major
modern/contemporary
corporations
and
business
organizations
textbooks.296 No existing textbook mentions privatization of historically

290. Wade, supra note 279, at 340.
291. Id. at 325.
292. Id. at 330.
293. Even as recently as 1971, scholars suggested that corporate activities and powers be limited.
LATTIN, supranote 32, at 170-79, 201-05.
294. Id. at 201-38.
295. Id. at 176.
296. Texts focus on such archaic issues as the power of the corporation to make charitable
contributions rather than the proper role of the corporation (notwithstanding chapter titles to the
contrary). See EISENBERG & Cox, supra note 7, at 251-68 (discussing the objective and conduct of the

corporation); KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 251-67 (section entitled "The Role and Purposes of the
Corporation"). Others give even more limited coverage on the power and role of corporations. See
CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 64-68; O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supranote 7, at 156-58, 684-86.
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public functions. Also ignored is the possibility that privatization is
potentially motivated by perverse incentives. Nor is there an opportunity
for law students to explore whether these companies establish or
implement social policy that is not in accordance with democratic
principles as reflected in the Constitution, but in accordance with highly
non-democratic corporate governance law.
VI. Too BIG TO FAIL AND THE TWILIGHT OF CAPITALISM

Yet another undemocratic outcome is the emergence of public firms
that are Too Big to Fail ("TBTF"). TBTF is the idea that the government
and taxpayers must expend taxpayer money to support certain financial
institutions and large public corporations when they suffer financial
difficulties.297 This public support is required, the argument goes, because
the corporations are big and interconnected, and national and global
economies would be destroyed if they failed.29 8 The concept of TBTF is
only briefly mentioned in leading corporate law textbooks today.2 99
Discussion of the massive government bailouts of TBTF public firms and
the corporate governance practices that led them to near financial collapse
is nearly invisible in the business law texts most adopted in law school
classrooms across the country.300
During the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 the U.S. government
bailed out large public corporations of all stripes ranging from massive
investment bankS 301 and the world's largest insurance company 302 to bank

297. During the crisis of 2008-2009 a total of 942 firms received government support from the
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") bailouts alone. These firms included banks, mortgage firms,
insurance companies, investment funds, other financial companies and auto companies. Bailout
Recipients, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last visited July 24, 2014).
298. The website of the NASDAQ stock market provides the following definition of TBTF:
Government practices that protect large banking organizations from the normal discipline of
the marketplace because of concerns that such institutions are so important to markets and
their positions so intertwined with those of other banks that their failure would be
unacceptably disruptive, financially and economically.
FinancialGlossary: Too Big to Fail, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/t/too-bigtoo-fail (last visited June 30, 2014).
299. The primary bailout in terms of both federal expenditures and political attention was the
TARP, created under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765, 3788, 3790. The Federal Reserve ("Fed") made massive emergency loans under section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2012). The FDIC used the bank deposit
insurance fund to back-up government guarantees of bank asset values and to guarantee bank debt
under the so-called systemic risk exception to its otherwise limited statutory authority. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c) (2012).
300.

See CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1169.

301. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Rescue Me: A FedBailout Crosses a Line, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2008, at BUI (detailing Fed bailout of Bear Stearns). Ultimately, the Fed actually subsidized the

446

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 92:397

holding companies 303 and automobile manufacturersi The government's
ad hoc approach to using taxpayer funds to bail out massive public firms
whose leadership had failed left the most seasoned economists
befuddled.305 The only common element to these ad hoc bailouts was the
inept but politically powerful management of the public corporations that
accepted government bailout funds.306 Today, the megabanks cast an even
larger shadow over our economy than before the crisis.307

Perhaps nothing illustrated the political power of the modern
corporation in action more than the astounding U.S. government bailouts
of the megabanks starting in 2008.308 William Poole, Former President of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, called the bailouts an "affront" to
capitalism and our democracy. 3 09 The government was so indulgent of
senior corporate executives during the bailout era that one Nobel-winning
economist termed the bailouts "ersatz capitalism" meaning "the privatizing

merger of Bear Steams with JPMorgan Chase, which effectively made JP Morgan Chase even bigger.
Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement on Financing Arrangement of JPMorgan Chase's
Acquisition of Bear Steams (Mar. 24, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/96GH-Y3P7.
302. A Nuclear Winter?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2008, at 88.

303. For example, in early 2009 the government announced a massive bailout of Bank of
America. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Federal Reserve and the FDIC Provide Assistance to
Bank of America (Jan. 16, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/3HDQ-6S85. The government did not
replace senior management at Bank of America nor reduce their compensation rights. See id. This
followed a similar bailout at Citigroup. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treas., Joint Statement by
Treasury, Federal Reserve and the FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), archived at
http://perma.cc/KC56-VK3A. Again, the government did not replace senior management nor negotiate
any reduction in their compensation. See id.
304. See Jonathan G. Katz, Who Benefited from the Bailout?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1568, 1592-93
(2011) (exploring differences between auto bailouts and financial institution bailouts).
305. See Anna Jacobson Schwartz, Op-Ed., Man Without a Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at
WKl2 ("The market was thus bewildered when the Fed rescued certain firms and not others. Mr.
Bemanke should have explained the principles behind these decisions. The market could not
understand why the Fed rescued Bear Steams and then permitted Lehman Brothers to die.").
306. What Were They Smoking?, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at 66. See also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed.,
Banks Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A37 ("The point is that the subprime crisis and the
credit crunch are, in an important sense, the result of our failure to effectively reform corporate
governance after the last set of scandals.").
307. See Harvey Rosenblum, Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why We Must End Too Big to
Fail-Now, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 6 exhibit 2 (2012).

308. Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking and the Social Contract, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1283, 1285
(2014) ("[The megabanks] make up less than one percent of the banks in the country, but control the
majority of the country's banking assets and wield a disproportionate amount of political power.").
Economist Simon Johnson states the reality well: "Do not deceive yourselves, the fact that Dodd-Frank
places constraints on the ability of the Fed, the fact that it modifies the emergency powers, the fact that
it changes other parts of the legal powers and authorities around the financial system does not mean
that there cannot be and will not be another bailout." Simon Johnson, Keynote Address: The

ContinuingProblem of "Too Big to Fail", 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 8 (2013).
309. Heidi N. Moore, Jumping Into the Regulatory Poolefor Banks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2009,
available at http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/04/03/jumping-into-the-regulatory-poole-for-banks/.
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of gains and the socializing of losses."310 Government inquiries conducted
by oversight panels later concluded that the bailouts amounted to
giveaways of taxpayer wealth to the megabanks and to their corporate
leadership.3 1' Why would government leaders consider no alternative other
than to bail out the very corporations that brought the economy to the
brink of disaster? Business law textbooks fail to discuss these issues,
thereby failing to give law students an opportunity to consider an
economic policy that posits that banks are so large and "important" to the
economy that their collapse threatens the entire global marketplace. 3 12
Even though many alternatives were available, the U.S. government
attempted to resolve the financial crisis by choosing a bailout strategy
most favorable to senior corporate managers at the firms most responsible
for the crisis.3 13 One prominent economist suggested forming new banks
with the funds used to bailout the megabanks because the new banks could
continue to lend based upon "pristine balance sheets" unencumbered by
toxic assets.314 Other alternatives included bankruptcy protection for the
failed megabanks or even allowing megabank failure, letting the market
work where the reckless and mismanaged firms could be absorbed by
stronger and better-managed firms.315 In truth, no alternative avenue was
seriously considered by the government other than the full-scale bailout of
Wall Street banks and firms that effectively redistributed losses from
private firms to taxpayers.3 16

310. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Op-Ed., Obama's Ersatz Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A31
(arguing that privatizing gains and socializing losses amounts to "ersatz capitalism").
311.

See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY'S

ACQUISITIONS 4 (Feb. 6, 2009), archivedat http://perma.cc/JUM7-NUF6 (presenting a valuation study
of the ten largest TARP transactions and concluding that "[o]verall, in the ten transactions, for each
$100 spent, the Treasury received assets worth approximately $66.").
312. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member of the Fin. Policy Comm., On
Being the Right Size, Speech at the Institute of Economic Affairs' 22nd Annual Series 12-13 (Oct. 25,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/SZ4N-PHA2 (stating that after adjusting for implicit subsidies
banks over $100 billion do not outperform smaller banks).
313. Simon Johnson, TARP: the Long Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/L9S6-CQA9 ("TARP was an essential piece of a necessary evil-that is, it saved the
American financial system from collapse, but it was put in place in a way that was excessively
favorable to the very bankers who had presided over the collapse. And this sets up exactly the wrong
incentives as we head into the next credit cycle."); Carter Dougherty, How Sweden Handled a
FinancialCrisis Without Burdening Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C9 (suggesting that the
U.S. follow Sweden's more punitive approach to bailouts).
314. Paul Romer, Op-Ed., Let's Start Brand New Banks, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123388681675555343.
315.

See, e.g., Guillermo Rosas, Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of Government Responses to

Banking Crises, 50 AM. J. POLL SCI. 175, 181 tbl.3 (2006).
316. For alternatives not considered by the U.S. government, see US Does Not Have Capitalism
Now: Stiglitz, CNBC (Jan. 19, 2010, 8:39 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/C24C-UNMG. See
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The U.S. government provided $23 trillion in commitments to save
Wall Street firms and other corporations between 2008 and 2009. ' Yet,
without precedent in either U.S. or global history, few senior executives
lost their job or faced serious investigation as a result of these
unprecedented bailouts. 1 The clear takeaway for senior corporate
executives is that disincentives associated with failure and reckless
leadership are now diluted. 31 9 Further, creditors will provide capital to
these firms at a lower cost.32 0 With no discipline from the credit markets,
the firms will take more risk onto their balance sheets.32 1 Ultimately, firms
not backed by the government's implied bailout promise cannot compete.
Only a fragmented financial sector without implied bailout guarantees
would secure competition.32 2 In short, these megafirm bailouts are
antithetical to the meritocratic competition that should be central to
capitalism.323
The bailouts of 2007-2009 stand without precedent. The government
ultimately guaranteed all of the obligations of the megabanks, including
compensation arrangements with senior managers.324 The government did
not attempt to negotiate for fair value in exchange for its mammoth
commitment of taxpayer capital and bailout monies for shareholders,

generally Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 471
(2010) (comparing failure under bankruptcy law to "ad-hoc" rescues chosen by government in
financial crisis and concluding that government's approach embedded perverse incentives).
317. Dawn Kopecki & Catherine Dodge, U.S. Rescue May Reach $23.7 Trillion, Barofsky Says,
BLOOMBERG (July 20, 2009), archivedat http://perma.cc/9SLD-V62U.
318.

See EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A FAIR DEAL FOR TAXPAYER

INVESTMENTS 1 (2009), archivedat http://perma.cc/7D4J-JZW6 ("92 percent of the management and
directors of the top 17 recipients of TARP funds are still in office").
319. Rosenblum, supra note 307, at 19 ("In practice, these rescues have penalized equity holders
while protecting bond holders and, to a lesser extent, bank managers. Disciplining the management of
big banks, just as happens at smaller banks, would reassure a public angry with those whose reckless
decisions necessitated government assistance.").
320. See id at 4 ("Moral hazard reinforces complacency. Moral hazard describes the danger that
protection against losses encourages riskier behavior. Government rescues of troubled financial
institutions encourage banks and their creditors to take greater risks, knowing they'll reap the rewards
if things turn out well, but will be shielded from losses if things sour.").
321. See Johnson, supra note 308, at 12 ("We just experienced the greatest financial crisis since
the 1930s because incentives in the financial system encouraged people to take excessive risk, to have
too little capital, too much leverage, and too much debt relative to thin cushions of equity.").
322. See Rosenblum, supra note 307, at 21 ("A financial system composed of more banks,
numerous enough to ensure competition in funding businesses and households but none of them big
enough to put the overall economy in jeopardy, will give the United States a better chance of
navigating through future financial potholes and precipices.").
323. See id at 4 ("When competition declines, incentives often turn perverse, and self-interest can
turn malevolent. That's what happened in the years before the financial crisis.").
324. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 11-13 (2010).
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managers and unsecured creditors alike. 325 This irresponsible fiscal
behavior on the part of the government corrodes the economic rule of law
as ordinary citizens witness the unfair indulgences that are granted to the
rich and powerful.326
The cost of bailing out TBTF institutions is not limited to actual
government outlays of taxpayer funds-as massive as those were. The
hidden and more injurious cost is that this totally non-punitive government
backstop and fiscal irresponsibility invites excessive risk taking within the
core of our economy-the financial sector. 3 27 The Great Financial Crisis
exemplifies this excessive and reckless risk inspired by an implicit bailout
guarantee.
Senior executives at major financial corporations contributed to
causing the crisis b saddling their firms with unprecedented levels of risk
and risky leverage. 2 The high-risk mortgages and debt assumed by these
executives and firms led to immediate short-term profits and positive
compensation gains for the executives at the cost of economic catastrophe
for all others.329 One commentator termed the debacle "one of the worst
miscalculations in the annals of risk management." 3 30 Savvy business and
finance experts recognized that this risk manipulation for profit resulted in
part from deeply flawed compensation arrangements for senior
executives. 33 1 TBTF exacerbates these perverse incentives in
compensation arrangements by assuring that failure and recklessness go
unsanctioned. Essentially, TBTF means that government insures failures

325. Id.
326. Rosenblum, supra note 307, at 4 ("[C]ompetition and the rule of law provide market
discipline that keeps self-interest in check and steers it toward the social good of producing more of
what consumers want at lower prices.").
327. Johnson, supra note 308, at 12 ("The cost of any financial crisis is not primarily in the
emergency provision of capital liquidity by authorities that may or may not be paid back; the cost of
financial crisis is the loss ofjobs and the loss of growth.").
328. E.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 152, at 859-60 ("The financial crisis helps make the case that
boards should do more monitoring. Corporate behavior in the crisis yielded enormous negative externalities
for the greater society. Corporations were able ... [to] incentivize risky behavior that yields negative
externalities, [so] it seems appropriate that boards do more to prevent the abuse of [limited liability].").
329. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 152, at 259-60 (finding that "the top executive teams of Bear
Steams and Lehman" derived billions in compensation, exceeding the value of the executives' stock
holdings at the beginning of the period, such that "the bottom-line payoffs of these executives during
2000-2008 were not negative but rather decidedly positive.").
330. Shawn Tully, Wall Street's Money Machine Breaks Down, FORTUNE, Nov. 26, 2007, at 75.
331. Raghuram Rajan, Bankers' Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2008, 4:21 PM),
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news-id=fto010920081142101282 ("[U]nless we fix incentives
in the financial system we will get more risk than we bargain for. Unless bankers offer these better
explanations, their enormous pay, which has been thought of as just reward for performance, will
deservedly come under scrutiny.").
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because there is simply no downside. Recklessness and short-termism are
incentivized as corporate leadership is wholly insulated from both criminal
sanction and economic injury.332 A more anti-capitalistic approach is

difficult to imagine.
The Dodd-Frank Act, despite being hailed as new and improved
financial sector regulation, does not prohibit the government-sponsored
bailouts implemented in 2008 and 2009. The Federal Reserve and the
FDIC can now legally engage in subsidizing the failures that occurred in
2008-2009. While Dodd-Frank included some minor changes in
containing the size of the megabanks and a new resolution authority, it is
very unlikely that either can be actualized.333 More importantly, and more
economically dangerous, the megabanks are much larger today than ever
before.334 Therefore, in the future, Congress may face the same dire
choices that came before it in the fall of 2008 when, on the eve of an
election, it faced either a total meltdown of the financial sector or being
forced to throw nearly $1 trillion in subsidized capital at the financial
sector to rescue it from demise.
Law students have no opportunity to consider TBTF and the suggestion
that it should be neutralized. Casebooks should provide law students with
an opportunity to explore whether megabanks should be broken-up in
order to restore proper incentives for board members and senior executive
officers on Wall Street and working in the financial sector.336 One is hard-

332.

RAMIREZ, supra note 2, at 173-79; see also Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial

Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012) (exploring why short-termism exists
"with particular attention given to the financial crisis of 2007-09").
333.

JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 324, at 207.

334. As Professor Murdock notes:
In 1970, the five largest banks held 17% of banking assets, the next ninety-five banks had
37% of assets, and the 12,500 smallest banks had 48% of assets. By 2010, the share of the
five largest banks had increased to 52%, the share of the next ninety-five had dropped to 32%,
and the share of the 5,700 smallest banks had plummeted to 16%.
Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation,FinancialInnovation, and "Too Big
to Fail", 90 DENv. U. L. REv. 505, 541-42 (2012).
335. Rosenblum, supra note 307, at 20.
336. As the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas put it:
The TBTF institutions that amplified and prolonged the recent financial crisis remain a
hindrance to full economic recovery and to the very ideal of American capitalism. It is
imperative that we end TBTF. In my view, downsizing the behemoths over time into
institutions that can be prudently managed and regulated across borders is the appropriate
policy response. Only then can the process of "creative destruction"-which America has
perfected and practiced with such effectiveness that it led our country to unprecedented
economic achievement-work its wonders in the financial sector, just as it does elsewhere in
our economy. Only then will we have a financial system fit and proper for serving as the
lubricant for an economy as dynamic as that of the United States.
Id. at 1.
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pressed to find even a mention of TBTF in any of the mainstream
corporations textbooks most adopted in U.S. law schools.
Further, while the Great Financial Crisis remains a fairly recent
occurrence, none of the major corporate law textbooks takes a critical look
at TBTF or the incentives it created as causes of the mortgage crisis.337
None of the leading corporate law textbooks provides a meaningful
exploration of the mortgage crisis at all.338 With the newest edition of the
O'Kelley text and the Eisenberg text published in 2014, the Choper text
published in 2013, the Klein text in 2012, and the most recent edition of
Epstein published in 2010, all had an opportunity to examine the causes of
the market meltdown and facilitate a conversation regarding the failure of
corporate law to protect against the crisis.33 9 But each of the texts fails to
engage in a critical examination of the financial crisis. It is difficult to
imagine why, on the heels of the greatest market correction and crisis
since the Great Depression, modem corporate law textbooks contain no
examination of the causes of the crisis or the continuing economic danger
of TBTF. The absence of any genuine analysis of the mortgage crisis, the
subprime mortgage market collapse and the resultant bailout of TBTF
megafirms deprives students of critical analyses and information. Students
are exposed only to textbooks written by authors who seem to be
apologists for a skewed capitalism that favors the elite and disfavors main
street citizens. The business law professoriate is failing an entire
generation of law graduates and lawyers.
VII. CONCLUSION

Corporate law textbooks fail to critically assess the entrenchment of
white male privilege at the commanding heights of the economy, and the
means by which this is perpetuated. Nor, do they critically assess the new
political power of the corporation. They provide little perspective on the
proper role of the corporation. The role of corporate governance in the
Great Financial Crisis of 2008 also garners little to no attention. TBTF

337. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 7, at 1175; CHOPER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1169;
KLEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 927; EPSTEIN ET AL., supranote 7, at 643. The issue will take on greater

significance in the future as more firm managers seek the government backing implicit in TBTF status.
See Cheyenne Hopkins & Robert Schmidt, House Lawmakers Say 'Too Big to Fail' Panel Too
Secretive, INS. J. (July 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/X6RQ-3RAJ (reporting that Prudential
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appears to be a taboo subject. These are core issues relating to corporate
governance and the essential nature and purpose of the corporate form in
our society.
Whether or not the casebook authors agree with more critical
perspectives on such issues, we argue that shielding a new generation of
leaders from such perspectives and important evidence cannot be justified.
Nobel laureates in economics-like Joseph Stiglitz or Paul Krugmanassail corporate governance law from the point of view of agency costs
and CEO power. The proof of the importance of this issue for future
business leaders is manifest in recent lawmaking and regulatory activity in
the wake of the financial crisis. Law students and future policymakers
should be allowed to consider such evidence in thinking about corporate
law.
When corporations reap profits from mass incarceration or
privatization of schools, students should consider the role of the modern
corporation. Traditionally, this topic formed an essential part of the
education of tomorrow's leaders. Students today should be given the same
opportunity to consider the monolithic demographic make-up of senior
executive officers and directors at the nation's most powerful firms,
particularly in an era of very high economic inequality. The basic
corporations' class is the logical locus for such learning.
Essentially, this Article demonstrates that no author or publisher of a
recent or longstanding leading corporate law textbook has addressed the
increasing economic and political power wielded by those in control of the
public firm, nor has any author confronted the legitimacy of this power
shift from a policy perspective. The enhanced power of CEOs gets little or
no mention, and changes in law and regulation that underlie this power
shift are not identified or analyzed. One can read entire corporate law
textbooks cover to cover and find little to no mention of TBTF, the role of
the public corporation in the collapse of capitalism in 2008, the lack of
diversity in the boardroom, the criminal immunity of some of those in
control of key financial corporations, or the incentives corporations have
to destroy the environment, foment war or imprison fellow citizens. This
failure leads to a critical disservice visited upon aspiring lawyers and
business leaders in our nation's law school classrooms.
If the power of the corporation is too awesome to speak of, if the
control of CEOs cannot be discussed, and if fundamental values such as
the environment, freedom and education, and the perverse incentives
created by corporate governance law and regulation are not part of the
discourse, then the modern public corporation will be a unique and costly
threat to society instead of the indispensable prop to modern capitalism
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that it was created to be. This Article concludes that training tomorrow's
leaders and corporate law experts in a more fulsome corporate law that
includes a power perspective and that questions the proper role of the

corporation in society ultimately paves the way for the full realization of
the potential of the public corporation.

